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INTRODUCTION

Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for startingas
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.
Benjamin N. Cardozo1
The rapid growth of the administrative state represents one of
the most significant, and some would add alarming, political
developments of the twentieth century. Federal regulatory agencies have proliferated, first as a centerpiece of the New Deal and
then again during the 1960s, and their powers have expanded as
well. Initially greeted with some suspicion, few today question
their legitimacy or centrality as legal institutions.2 More so than
do the courts, federal agencies exercise pervasive control over
economic and other activities in this country. Whatever their
failings and accompanying calls for reform or more sweeping
deregulation, these entities inevitably will continue to do the
work of government.
Although many scholars have emphasized procedural rights
and opportunities for judicial review as mechanisms for supervising and legitimizing agency actions, the initial delegation
of authority from Congress must remain as the focal point for
any such effort. Recently, however, it seems that enabling statutes have received insufficient attention as imposing limits on

1. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.); see
also Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d
Cir. 1929) (Hand, J.) (cautioning against the use of metaphors); Michael Boudin,
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 395 (1986) ("Persuasive as rhetoric, metaphor is even more potent as a concealed form of argument by
analogy . ..

[and it] is a means of discovering new insights in law..

. ."); Steven

L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1160-71, 1199-206 (1989) (evaluating and generally
criticizing metaphoric legal reasoning).
2. See James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1075 (1975); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1325 (1986). But cf Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (recognizing the
general acceptance of the legitimacy of the modem administrative state, but arguing
that it cannot be reconciled with various structural limitations found in the text of
the Constitution).
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agency power. Once regarded as akin to corporate charters,
some commentators now regard these delegations more fluidly,
analogizing an agency's organic act either to a constitution or to
an even looser source of authority to fashion common law on a

subject.
Actually, Professor James Landis captured this pragmatic
spirit more than sixty years ago when he defended the growing
reliance on administrative agencies during the New Deal:
One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune
to know, I believe, never read, at least more than casually,
the statutes that he translated into reality. He assumed that
they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an
industry and, upon that understanding, he sought his own
solutions. Limitations upon his powers that counsel brought
to his attention, naturally, he respected; but there is an enormous difference between the legalistic form of approach that
from the negative vantage of statutory limitations looks to
see what it must do, and the approach that considers a problem from the standpoint of finding out what it can do.'
In this respect, agency officials arguably resemble members of
Congress who may pay little heed to constitutional constraints
on their powers.4 The imperative to find solutions to pressing
problems of the day cannot, however, divert attention from questions about who if anyone within the federal government properly
shoulders that task. Justice Cardozo offered a more skeptical
perspective on the New Deal revolution, cautioning against the
creation of "roving commission[s] to inquire into evils and upon
discovery correct them."5

3. JAMES M. LANDIs, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75-76 (1938); see also id. at
49 n.2 (quoting the SEC's justification for liberally interpreting one of its enabling
acts as consistent with the Supreme Court's "'exposition of a great organic act
[namely, the U.S. Constitution] in M'Culloch v. Maryland'"(citation omitted)).
4. Cf. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609-11 (1983) (discussing Congress as an independent
decision-making body that often fails to consider the constitutional limitations on its

power).
5. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring). One might say that agencies abhor a vacuum. See infra
notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing agencies' tendencies toward expansion); cf. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 277 (16th ed. 1992) (highlighting
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Are agencies' enabling statutes best understood as charters,
constitutions, or sources of common law norms? Each of these
conceptions carries its own interpretive baggage, 6 and each finds
apparent support in the Supreme Court's much cited and analyzed decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' This Article does not seek to add to the
wealth of literature evaluating Chevron and its aftermath,' except to suggest that the judiciary's rush to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language has
emboldened agencies to push the outer limits of their jurisdiction. In just the last year, for example, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) confidently announced that it already enjoyed the power to restrict human cloning experiments, and the
equally entrepreneurial Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) floated a proposal to require that licensed television
broadcasters provide free air time to candidates for public office.9
Instead, this Article suggests that the nature of "jurisdictional"
questions, in administrative law as elsewhere, demands special
attention from the courts. By granting the government's petition
for certiorari to review the lower court's invalidation of the toSpinoza's remark that "[n]ature abhors a vacuum"); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 22 (1962) ("Lack of definite standards creates a void into
which attempts to influence are bound to rush; legal vacuums are quite like physical
ones in that respect.").
6. See generally Max Black, More About Metaphor, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT
19, 30 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) ("Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged
model."); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1083 (1989) ("If
we refuse to look at our metaphors and see the paradoxes they express, if we simply speak them, our metaphors can shelter us from our paradoxes.").
7. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Although the Court has not applied the Chevron
framework consistently, it continues to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous language in their enabling acts. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 423-32 (1999); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 385-94
(1999); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1998);
Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 255-61 (1995).
8. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An
Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1994, at 185, 229 n.116 ("The loss of forests necessary to make the paper to print
all of the articles written on the proper standard of review in interpreting statutes
following [Chevron] might well have justified requiring the Supreme Court to issue
an environmental impact statement along with the opinion.").
9. For additional information regarding these initiatives, see infra notes 50, 76
and accompanying text.
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bacco regulations promulgated by the FDA,"0 the Supreme Court
appears poised to tackle the question directly this Term.
Part I summarizes the three competing metaphors. First, it
develops the classic analogy between agency enabling statutes
and corporate charters. From this perspective, a court reviewing
a regulatory action not explicitly authorized by the statute
would invalidate it as ultra vires. Next, Part I introduces the
constitutional metaphor sometimes used to describe enabling
statutes, coupled with a preference for a dynamic rather than
textualist approach to their interpretation. From this perspective, organic acts are just that, living instruments that can
adapt to new circumstances. Finally, Part I discusses the recently
suggested common law metaphor for understanding the operation of enabling statutes, an even looser conception of how legislation operates to limit the range of permissible agency actions.
Part II attempts a synthesis of these competing metaphors,
asking whether and to what extent courts should condone bureaucratic tendencies toward the expansion of delegated powers.
In short, should concerns about "judicial activism" lead us to
embrace administrative activism instead? Part II argues that
judicial scrutiny of agency behavior remains necessary to ensure
fidelity to the enabling statutes; that the same flaws inherent in
recognizing the federal courts' power to make common law based
on nothing more than the grant of subject matter jurisdiction
apply with equal force to agencies; and that Chevron deference
should not extend to the review of jurisdictional questions. Although formalism in law has become decidedly d6class6," this

10. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 176 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1495 (Apr. 26, 1999) (No. 98-1152). As this Article
went to press, the Supreme Court agreed that the FDA lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco. See infra note 206; see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d
1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (invalidating regulations premised on an
agency's interpretation of its enabling act that was so broad as to violate the
nondelegation doctrine), petitions for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (Feb. 8, 2000) (Nos.
99-1257, 99-1263 & 99-1265).
11. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-11, 548 (1988) (recognizing the pejorative connotations of the term, but arguing that contemporary
aversions to it may be somewhat misplaced); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:
On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950-52, 1016 (1988) (acknowledging the criticism of formalism and defending against it). See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. Ci. L. REV. 527 (1999).
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Article concludes that the more conventional corporate charter
metaphor strikes the most defensible balance in this context.
I.

COMPARING THE COMPETING METAPHORS

The charter, constitutional, and common law metaphors
-considered in turn below-reflect historical developments as
much as they represent competing conceptions about regulatory
statutes. Although they share important features as well as
significant limitations, this Part attempts to tease apart these
three approaches and highlight their differences as a prelude to
the normative discussion reserved for Part II. Each metaphor
suggests a distinct relationship between administrative agencies
and the courts, accompanied by different expectations about the
degree of fidelity government officials must accord to their delegations of legislative authority from Congress. As one moves
from the charter to the constitutional and then to the common
law metaphor, the permissible range of administrative initiative
and creativity increases dramatically.
A. EnablingActs as CorporateCharters
The very term "agency" implies some sort of principal-agent
relationship. In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall commented:
"It is the plain dictate of common sense, and the whole political
system is founded on the idea, that the departments of government are the agents ofthe nation, and will perform, within their respective spheres, the duties assigned to them."" John Locke provided the foundation for the notion that government officials act as
agents constrained by their delegated authority, 3 and the Framers
of the Constitution enshrined it in their own "charter" for the
federal government.' 4 Although courts may imply powers reason12. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 15,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 207, 211
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
13. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 224 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
Hafner Press 1947) (1690) ("[Wlhosoever in authority exceeds the power given him

by the law .... ceases in that to be a magistrate and, acting without authority,
may be opposed . . . ."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamil-

ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (MThere is no position which depends on clearer
principles than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the
commission under which it is exercised, is void.").
14. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,

20001

INTERPRETING AGENCY ENABLING ACTS

1469

ably incidental to those granted explicitly, empowering an agent
to act on the principal's behalf typically does not make the agent
the sole judge of whether an act falls within the scope of the
15
agency: the agent still must abide by the principal's commands. 16
Although the principal-agent model may be overly simplistic,
the more traditional notion regarding the place of administrative
agencies usefully drew attention to their subordinate role to the
enumerated branches of government.' Because the Constitution

1432-37 (1987); id. at 1433-34 ("The analogy between corporate charters and political
constitutions had profound implications.... [It] suggested that government power
could be strictly bounded by its 'charter."); id. at 1436 ("Within the sphere of these
delegated powers, government agents could legitimately compel obedience in the
name of their sovereign principal, but those agents lacked authority to go beyond
the scope of their agency.").
15. See Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
implied authority is intended by the principal; it is not merely a function of the
agent's independent control); Lewis v. Washington Area Metro. Transit Auth., 463
A.2d 666, 670 n.7 (D.C. 1983) ("The doctrine of implied actual authority focuses upon
the agent's understanding of his authority: whether the agent reasonably believed,
because of conduct of the principal (including acquiescence) communicated directly or
indirectly to him, that the principal desired him so to act."); see also Stanford v.
Otto Niederer & Sons, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining an
agent's duty to follow the principal's instructions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 26, 33, 35, 44, 385(1) (1959) (same); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 69 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the
agent's duty of obedience to the principal's instructions).
16. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 131 (1997) ("[Algencies may appear to behave more
like independent entrepreneurs seeking funding from the Congress for projects of
their own than like well-instructed agents implementing their principal's orders."); cf.
Carlos E. Gonzxlez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation,74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 65964, 729-30 (1996) (disputing the notion that a principal-agency relationship exists
between Congress and the courts when judges interpret statutes).
17. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It
may be presumed that Congress does not intend administrative agencies, agents of
Congress' own creation, to ignore clear jurisdictional, regulatory, statutory, or constitutional commands .

. . .");

INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) ("The

bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of
the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the
statute that created it .

. . .");

Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946)

("[An agency] acts as a delegate to the legislative power.... An agency may not
finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function."); Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("The determination of the
extent of authority given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested."); see also Richard L. Revesz, Specialized
Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1139
n.129 (1990) ("Principal-agent analyses of the relationship between Congress and
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does not specifically provide for such agencies, Congress must first
create them."8 Thus, the enabling legislation essentially represents an agency's charter, and courts continue to describe actions
taken beyond the scope of that delegated power as ultra vires, 19 a
direct reference to the classical corporate law and principalagency doctrines.2 ° In England, the doctrine retains vitality as the
primary basis for judicial review of agency action, with one leading treatise
calling it "the central principle of administrative
21
law."

administrative agencies are influential in the political science literature. . . . They
are virtually absent, however, from the legal literature."); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May
Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199, 1206-07, 1213-16 (1981)
(arguing that Congress rather than the President should be regarded as the principal); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1239-41, 1254 (1989) (painting a
more complicated picture of multiple principal-agency interrelationships, and urging an
emphasis on the relationship existing between the President and federal regulators).
18. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Presidens Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 592-93 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994); Animal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg, 900 F.2d 195, 196 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1927) ("The theory is that every public officer has
marked out for him by law a certain area of Jurisdiction.' . . . [Ihf he oversteps
those bounds, then the court will intervene. In this form, the law of court review of
the acts of public officers becomes simply a branch of the law of ultra vires.");
WILLIAM F. FoX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 17 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the ultra vires doctrine as enforcing jurisdictional limits on agency action);
Matthew D. Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REv. 245, 251-55 (1998)
(discussing the courts' application of traditional agency principles to just compensation claims where a government official acted beyond the scope of her delegated authority); cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998) ("For a
court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal
law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act
ultra vires.").
20. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276, 1305-07 (1984) (noting this parallel between formalistic approaches to
both administrative and corporate law, but ultimately rejecting the principal-agency
model as establishing meaningful constraints on bureaucratic behavior in either setting).
21. SIR WMLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (7th ed.
1994); see also id. at 41-46 (elaborating on the continued application of the ultra
vires doctrine to agencies in England); Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy
Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review,
55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1996) (explaining that the ultra vires doctrine provides the
essential foundation for judicial review).
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rations could only exercise those powers and pursue those purposes specified in a grant of authority from a legislature. Any
actions taken beyond such authority were void as ultra vires.2 2
Moreover, courts narrowly construed corporate charters. One
treatise writer explained at the end of that century: "[Glrants to
private corporations shall be construed strictly against the
grantees; and to prevail they .must be express and clear beyond
a doubt; a doubt defeats the power." 3 In part, this restrictive
view grew out of the notion that corporations were organized to
serve special purposes that would impact the public interest.2 4
As corporations instead became engines for private enterprise,
conceptions of their status and freedom of action changed markedly. Nowadays, where the filing of articles of incorporation has
replaced the issuance of a corporate charter, shareholders rarely
succeed in claiming that a corporate decision was unlawful on
ultra vires grounds because state statutes limit the application
of this doctrine and, more importantly, provide that a corporation may pursue "any lawful purpose" without requiring a detailed enumeration of powers.2 5 Have regulatory statutes similarly changed?

22. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW- 518-19 (2d ed.
1985); JAMES WHLARU HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 13-57 (1970); see also McDermott v.
Bear Film Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 486, 489 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ("[The phrase ultra
vires describes action which is beyond the purpose or power of the corporation.").
23. REUBEN A. REESE, THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 12 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1897); see also Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) ("Being the mere creature
of law, [a corporation] possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."). Authorized actions are characterized as intra vires. See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note
21, at 44 ("Every administrative act is either intra vires or ultra vires; and the
court can condemn it only if it is ultra vires.").
24. See JAmS WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 15-17 (1956).
25. See 1 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 3.01(a), 3.02, 3.04 (3d ed. 1998); Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires-Ultra Useless: The Myth of State Interest in Ultra
Vires Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 89-90 (1983). For a rare, modem decision applying the ultra vires doctrine in a shareholder suit, see Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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B. EnablingActs as Constitutions
Even if one generally accepted the analogy to corporate charters, some observers have argued that organic acts represent a peculiar class of charters: charters that create government. From
this perspective, enabling legislation resembles a mini-constitution
that establishes the agency and grants it a fairly broad mandate, perhaps accompanied by provisions that operate like a
necessary and proper clause. The American colonies were, after
all, established through corporate charters. 26 Nowadays, municipal charters have precisely such a character,27 though courts
tend to construe governmental powers delegated to municipalities quite narrowly. 28 Although sometimes described as constitutions as well, charters establishing2 international organizations
also tend to be narrowly construed. 1
26. See Amar, supra note 14, at 1432-33; cf. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1294-301 (1999) (describing
recent exercises in constitution making around the world, and suggesting various
explanations for why they differ in form as well as in substance).
27. See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 746 (1996) ("For municipal charters,... the same characteristics of relative brevity, generality and permanence,
and of special procedures for adoption, prevail."). Professor Strauss, however, distinguished such constitutional forms from "ordinary" legislation by virtue of the latter's
judicial reviewability for consistency with constitutional limits, placing statutes
(whether delegating broad or narrow power to the executive) one rung beneath constitutions, and one rung above agency regulations, in an institutional hierarchy of
constitutive documents issued by government. See id. at 747-48, 750; see also Peter
L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463, 1478 (1992) (adding
that "courts will be much more aggressive in determining the authority question respecting legislative rules than statutes").
28. See W.M. Schlosser Co. v. School Bd., 980 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir. 1992);
Cosgrove v. City of West Memphis, 938 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ark. 1997); Country Joe,
Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Minn. 1997); Premium Standard
Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Township, 946 S.W.2d 234, 238-41 (Mo. 1997); Bowers v. City
of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287-88 (N.C. 1994); 2A EUGENE McQuILLiN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 10.03, 10.09-.12, 10.18-.23 (3d ed. rev. 1996); cf. City

of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 27-28 (Fla. 1992) (explaining that home-rule
charters allow municipalities to exercise any powers not expressly prohibited).
29. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20)
("These purposes [i.e., pursuing international peace and security] are broad indeed,
but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate them are unlimited."); see
also G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, in THE NEW
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: DECISIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 177, 178 (Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffiann eds., 1991) (explaining that a key function of a
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Because they trump other sources of law and are designed to
be relatively immutable, written constitutions enjoy a special
rank and dignity.30 Certain statutes may share these characteristics. For instance, the Supreme Court has analogized the
Sherman Act 3 ' to a constitution, though one whose contours the
federal courts define.32 Similarly, a number of commentators
have likened the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 1 to a constitution, though mainly to capture its open-textured quality and
evolving judicial constructions rather than to suggest tremendous flexibility for agency activities.3 4 Such characterizations
build upon the concept of "framework statutes," which seeks to
distinguish certain foundational enactments from more mundane
legislation.

charter is to keep the organization's powers under control); cf JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 6-8 (1998)

(using a constitutional metaphor to describe the WTO).
30. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change,
88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 325-27 (1989); see also Reed Dickerson, Statutes and Constitutions in an Age of Common Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 773, 775, 780-81 (1987) (assessing the parallels between constitutions and statutes).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
32. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As
a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."); see also California v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 490 (1962) ("Our function is to see that the policy
entrusted to the courts [by the Clayton Act] is not frustrated by an administrative
agency."); Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 375-76 (1986) (criticizing the constitutional
conception of the Sherman Act).
33. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-559, 701-706 (1994)).
34. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Administrative ProcedureAct and Regulatory
Reform: A Reconciliation, 10 ADeIN. L.J. AA1. U. 35, 49 (1996) (concluding that "the
APA has worked reasonably well precisely because it has, like a constitution, evolved
especially through judicial clarification and refinement"); Cynthia R. Farina, On
...
Misusing "Revolution" and 'Reform": Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare
Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 626 n.189 (1998) (referring to the APA as "constitutionlike"); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative ProcedureAct: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 253 (1986); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADIIN. L. REV. 567, 583 n.115 (1992) (suggesting that the APA
"functions more like our Constitution than a statute"); see also Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 90 (1998) (drawing an analogy between the APA and the Constitution).
35. See Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and
Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHm. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976) (coining this
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Perhaps agency enabling acts also resemble a constitution. As
a student enrolled in an administrative law course more than a
decade ago, I recall seeing the following formulation on the
chalkboard:
Statute : Agency :: Constitution : Congress
We were also told that the judiciary provided the primary check
in both settings, though possible differences existed in the degree of deference that courts would extend in each context. This
analogy was hardly novel. As Professor Cass Sunstein once suggested, "[t]he relation of the Constitution to Congress parallels
the relation of regulatory statutes to agencies."36 In 1943, Professor Hans Morgenthau traced it to language in Supreme Court
decisions going back to the turn of the century.

term to describe legislation, like the War Powers Resolution, that is designed to
interpret ambiguities in constitutional text and establish procedures for resolving
interbranch power struggles when the courts decline to intervene); Kenneth W. Dam,
The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (1977) (calling
such framework statutes "quasi-constitutional"); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039 (1997) (calling the APA
a framework statute with parallels to the U.S. Constitution). Along the same lines,
some scholars have analogized enabling statutes to architectural blueprints. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (1996) ("[Als in any long-running regulatory program, FDA
officials have served as both general contractors and sub-contractors in constructing
the modem legal framework from the legislature's working drawings."); cf. Paul M.
Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (using an architectural metaphor to describe the
Constitution).
36. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) (adding that "[in both contexts, an independent arbiter

should determine the nature of the limitation"); see also Pacific States Box & Basket
Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) ("Where [the police power is exercised] by
a statute, the legislature has acted under power delegated to it through the Constitution. Where the regulation is by an order of an administrative body, that body
acts under a delegation from the legislature."); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Bargaining for
Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve
Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 885 (1989) (referring to an "agency's statutory (or 'regulatory constitutional') power").
37. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28
IOWA L. REV. 575, 586 n.36 (1943) (noting that "the relation between administrative
regulation and statute is in principle identical with the one between statute and
constitution"); id. at 600 ("[A]s Congress holds delegated powers not expressly enu-
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This view, however, begs more serious questions about how
and who best to interpret the Constitution. Without delving into
this far broader debate," it should suffice to say that proponents
of this analogy for enabling statutes have assumed a dynamic
rather than textual approach to that task. Thus, those who compare enabling statutes to the U.S. Constitution expect that the
federal courts will construe grants of jurisdiction broadly just as
they have done in the case of the Commerce Clause, 9 with a few
remarkable recent exceptions.40 In a sense, they view agency or-

merated in the Constitution, so an administrative officer may have the authority to
exercise delegated powers not expressly pointed out in the statute."); id. ("Hence,
there are implied powers vested in administrative agencies as there are implied
powers vested in Congress, [though] the extent of those powers generally being proportionate to the extent of expressly delegated powers and therefore usually larger
in Congress than in the administrative agencies.").
38. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999);
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1089, 1118-20 (1997); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1984); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition,
and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional 'Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551
(1985); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 TEX.L. REV. 693
(1976); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235-49
(1995); Symposium, Fidelity, Economic Liberty, and 1937, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1999); Symposium, Textualism and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085
(1998).
39. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 27677 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-25 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-43 (1937); see also Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 321-22 (1992); cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (objecting to the notion "that federal
political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of
their own power"); Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power, 73
VA. L. REV. 1387i 1443-55 (1987) (criticizing the expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause ushered in during the New Deal Era); Alex Kozinski, Introduction
to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 5 (1995) (rechristening it as the
"'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause").
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down a federal statute that had prohibited the possession of guns in the vicinity of schools as
beyond the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnical Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act on similar grounds), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999); see also Richard
A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
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ganic acts as "living," or largely aspirational, constitutions. If,
instead, courts were to choose originalism and strictly limit lawmakers to their enumerated powers," then the constitutional
metaphor for agency enabling acts seemingly adds nothing to
the traditional analogy to corporate charters.
Commentators have invoked the constitutional metaphor to
defend regulatory initiatives against claims that an agency had
overstepped the limits on its jurisdiction. 42 In the early 1970s,

167 (1996) (criticizing the majority's unnecessary timidity in Lopez). See generally
Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 635 (1996); Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 533 (1995).
41. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) ("Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552
("We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers."); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 346
(1935) ("The Federal Government is one of enumerated powers . . . ."); see also William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent
Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 361 (1999) ("When a specific
clause of the Constitution . . . has been construed as containing general limitations
on Congress's power, Congress may not avoid those limitations by legislating under
another clause."); H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments, 65 U. Cmi. L. REV. 365, 369 (1998) (book review) (observing that "the past
few years have seen a dramatic resurgence in the Supreme Court's interest in enforcing the limits on Congress's powers that derive from their enumeration in Article
1"). The Tenth Amendment confirms that the federal government can only exercise
power surrendered by the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156
(1992) ("[Tlhe two inquiries are mirror images of each other."); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered."). At the state level, in contrast, specific
enumeration of powers, coupled with a necessary and proper clause, is not essential.
See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647,
658 (1986) (noting "the well-established doctrine that American state constitutions
are not grants of power but rather limitations," and adding that "a state exists independently of its constitution and thus its government may constitutionally take any
action whatever, unless specifically restrained by some provision of the state constitution").
42. See James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why the FDA
Will Prevail After the Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 509, 515 (1997) ("If the statute is a constitution then the FDA can reach anywhere and regulate anything not
proscribed by Congress."); see also Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to
Statutory InterpretationPro-Environmentalist?:Why PragmaticAgency Decisionmaking
Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1291, 1287 (1996)
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the FDA's Chief Counsel invoked the constitutional metaphor to
justify an expansive reading of the agency's residual rulemaking
authority. 4 Accordingly, unless explicitly prohibited, "the fact
that Congress simply has not considered or spoken on a particular issue certainly is no bar to the [FDA] exerting initiative and
leadership in the public interest."44 The constitutional metaphor
might also be invoked by agencies in the hope that courts will
reduce their intensity of substantive review, using a minimum
rationality test accompanied by presumptions of regularity extended to legislatures when courts are asked to review the merits
45
of a statute. Generally, however, this tack has not succeeded.
Beginning in the 1960s, both agencies and the courts became
interested in the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking as an
alternative to policy formulation by either formal and cumbersome rulemaking or incremental adjudication. Thus, the courts
generally have implied broad rulemaking authority from less
than clear delegations to agencies.4 6 One court even cited the
(conceding that "courts should prevent agencies from exceeding their delegated authority," but otherwise urging that, in cases of ambiguity, agencies be allowed to
select "a less probable interpretation of a statute if that interpretation best serves
current policy interests").
43. See Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 28 FoOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973) ("[IThe Act must be
regarded as a constitution.... The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [the Act's
fundamental] objectives through the most effective and efficient controls that can be
devised.").
44. Id. at 179; see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)
(suggesting that the FDA's enabling statute "be treated as a working instrument of
government and not merely as a collection of English words"); Richard A. Merrill,
FDA and the Effects of Substantive Rules, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 270, 273-75,
278-79 (1980) (elaborating on the FDA's residual authority to issue legislative regulations through informal rulemaking). Agency officials continue to take this expansive
view of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., David A. Kessler & Wayne L. Pines, The Federal
Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, 264 JAMA 2409, 2411
(1990) ("Until further judicial decisions or congressional action clarifies the FDA's
specific authority in the area of [drug product] promotion, the FDA will continue to
assert broad jurisdiction.").
45. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 626-27 (1986) (plurality);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9
(1983) ("We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded
legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency
in fulfilling its statutory mandate."). But cf. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v.
White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (using a minimum rationality test when a state
agency's order was challenged on substantive due process grounds).
46. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609-14 (1991); National
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article in which the FDA chief counsel had espoused his expansive view, though it regarded the constitutional metaphor as
"hyperbole," 7 thereby retaining for itself decisions about the
powers and scope of jurisdiction granted to the agency instead of
leaving those determinations to the agency's good judgment.
In decisions involving the Federal Communications Commission, some courts have openly endorsed a constitutional analogy.
The enabling statute itself uses a vague "public interest" standard to guide the agency's licensing decisions, and the Supreme
Court has long read this delegation quite generously.48 More
recently, some lower courts have characterized the Commission's
general rulemaking authority as an administrative "necessary
and proper" clause that "empowers the Commission to deal with
the unforeseen-even if that means straying a little way beyond

Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting a "lack
of hesitation in construing broad grants of rule-making power to permit promulgation of rules with the force of law"); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n,
327 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("All authority of the Commission need not be
found in explicit language. . . While the action of the CommIssion must conform
with the terms, policies and purposes. of the Act, it may use means which are not in
all respects spelled out in detail."); see also id. at 896-97 ("While the Natural Gas
Act is a statute and is not to be construed as a 'constitution,' nevertheless the problems placed under Commission administration, with consequent Commission responsibilities, call upon the courts to give the Act a scope reasonably necessary to permit
the agency to perform its tasks consistently with the provisions and purposes of the
legislation.").
47. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248 n.10 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("We do not take sides on the issue tendered, but we think Mr. Hutt's
language to be conscious hyperbole. The test is ... whether delegation may be
fairly inferred from the general purpose.").
48. See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593-96 (1981); National
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 218-20 (1943); see also Glen 0. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64
VA. L. REv. 169, 174 (1978) (describing the Communications Act as "a grant of plenary power to the FCC to regulate electronic communications as it deems appropriate"); id. ("Broad, ill-defined, and self-enlarging powers are an attribute the FCC
shares with many other federal agencies."); infra note 49. Other agencies have had
less success in using "public interest" standards in their enabling statutes to justify
expansions in their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,
413 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting an agency's effort to "advance into an area not contemplated by Congress"); see also NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662,
670 (1976) (noting that "[t]he use of the words 'public interest' in the Gas and Power
Acts is not a directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination" in
employment practices by regulated companies).
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the apparent boundaries of the Act-to the extent necessary to
regulate effectively those matters already within the boundaries."49 How far, however, could an agency stray? For instance,
the Clinton administration recently suggested that the FCC
demand that broadcasters provide free air time for advertisements by political candidates, which may generally comport with
the "public interest" standard for licensing but, apart from the
medium for transmission, seems well beyond the Commission's
authority and instead a task for Congress." Nonetheless, if re-

49. North Am. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (adding that this provision "is not infinitely elastic" and "could not properly be used to
regulate an activity unrelated to the communications industry"); accord Mobile Com-

c

munications Corp. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court
previously had interpreted part of the enabling act as allowing the FCC to assert
unenumerated powers or jurisdiction when "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968);
see also id. at 165, 170-71 (adding that, "[d]espite its inability to obtain amendatory
legislation, the Commission has, since 1960, gradually asserted jurisdiction over
CATV," but finding nothing improper with that expansion in its authority); AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. 1d., 525 U.S. 366, 377-86 (1999) (sustaining the FCC's "jurisdiction" to issue regulations permitting local competition by long-distance carriers);
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 368-74 (1973) (upholding
the Federal Reserve Board's authority to issue rules under the Truth-in-Lending
Act); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968) ("We are, in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention, unwilling to prohibit
administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes.");
FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("Underlying the whole law is
recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess
sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors."). But cf. GTE Serv. Corp. v.
FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting the FCC's assertion of authority
over data processing services provided by common carriers); Robinson, supra note 48,
at 198 n.67 (criticizing the constitutional metaphor in this context).
50. See FCC Backs Away from Plan Aimed at Giving Free Air Time to Candidates,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1998, at Bl; Harold Furchtgott-Roth, No Such Thing as a
Free Ad, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1998, at AN0 (criticizing this suggestion as beyond
the FCC's authority); see also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706-09
(1979) (holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to require that cable operators provide public access channels, in part because Congress had expressly prohibited
the imposition of common carrier obligations on broadcasters); Novel Procedures in
FCC License Proceedings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin.
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 18 (1999) (testimony of Prof.
Lars Noah, Univ. of Florida College of Law) (arguing that the FCC should not be
able to request concessions during licensing "that have no relevant relation to the
statute, no matter how malleable the 'public interest' standard might be"); Glen 0.
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viewing courts view the organic act as an adaptable constitution,
then the FCC's initiative might well have prevailed against an
ultra vires challenge.
C. EnablingActs as Sources of Common Law Norms
An even more flexible variant of the constitutional metaphor
views enabling legislation as expressing little more than broad
goals to pursue, much like common law norms explicated by
judges in the course of resolving private disputes. In his characteristically provocative manner, Professor Cass Sunstein recently
promoted this idea-a thesis both descriptive and normative-in
the course of defending the FDA's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over tobacco products.5 As he explained:
[W]ithout much fanfare, agencies have become modern
America's common law courts, and properly so. The basic
task of common law courts is to specify abstract standards
(often involving reasonableness) and to adapt legal rules to
particular contexts as facts, social understandings of facts,
and underlying values change over time. Operating as common law courts, agencies have, as they should, considerable
power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and circumstances.5 2

Robinson, The Electronic FirstAmendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J.
899, 927 (1998) (mentioning the FCC's brief flirtation with deploying the fairness
doctrine in order to control tobacco and other television advertising).
51. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common
Law Courts, 47 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1062 (1998) ("In applying the [Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act] to tobacco, the FDA performed a lawful common law function, one that
also has a high degree of democratic legitimacy."). Twenty years earlier, Professor
Glen Robinson had noted, but generally criticized, this tendency at another agency.
See Robinson, supra note 48, at 174 n.13 ("The FCC's regulation of cable television
is justifiable only by reference to a kind of common-law tradition that gives regulatory agencies organic independence from their original legislative mandates.").
52. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1019; see also id. at 1059 ("In a common law era,
it was the job of common law judges to apply incompletely specified legal doctrines
to new contexts and to supply new understandings of those doctrines, which were
typically phrased as abstractions."); id. at 1060 (describing dynamic interpretation of
statutes as "an administrative task, not a judicial one," and calling the common law
decision making of agencies "an omnipresent feature of the modem legal landscape");
id. at 1068 ("As a matter of simple practice, administrative agencies have become
America's common law courts ....
In view of agency self-interest and the exercise of
power by self-interested private groups, this development is not without risks. On

2000]

INTERPRETING AGENCY ENABLING ACTS

1481

Previously, Professor Sunstein had explained that the emergence
of administrative agencies signalled a "rejection of the common
law system,"53 though now he appears to endorse the recognition
of common law authority in this newer set of legal institutions
situated outside of the judicial branch.
Chevron deference provides the essential predicate for Professor Sunstein's view, which he characterizes as a "counterMarbury" principle, by essentially allowing agencies to displace
courts as the final arbiters of the meaning of their enabling
statutes.5 4 In short, he thinks that Chevron, rather than simply
expressing a limited command to defer when undertaking judicial review, directed the federal courts to abdicate much of their
supervisory role. Even if the lower courts have adopted such a
highly deferential posture,5 5 the Supreme Court and some commentators remain quite wary of the consequences of this strong
reading of Chevron, and the FDA's tobacco regulations may test
the outer limits of its call for deference. 6
Just as proponents of the constitutional metaphor assume a
dynamic interpretive approach, those favoring a common law
analogy evidently imagine a bold and creative, rather than cau-

balance, however, it is highly salutary."); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 550-55 (1997) (book review) (suggesting this
notion in connection with an initial defense of the FDA's tobacco regulations).
53. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 892-93 (1987).

54. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1058 ("Chevron has granted agencies two important common law functions, those of specifying statutory terms and of adapting
those terms to new facts and values. The question for post-Chevron law has involved the
identification of limits on those common law functions.&"); see also id. at 1055 ("In the
modem era, most of the key work of statutory interpretation is, of course, not done
by courts, but rather by federal agencies."). But cf Bowen v. Michigan Academy of
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (reaffirming the modem presumption of
judicial review of agency action, explicitly invoking Marbury v. Madison).
55. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron. An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30-31, 47
(1998) (finding fairly high rates of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
language in their enabling statutes, but rejecting the "blank check" criticism); Peter
H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1058-59 (finding increased affirmance
rates by the lower courts in the immediate wake of Chevron).
56. See Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: (Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 677, 685-86 (1998) (criticizing the FDA's request for serial Chevron deference,
with each step compounding the initial error).
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tiously incremental or interstitial, approach to agency decision
making. 57 This approach is distinct from questions about whether
the courts should develop a common law of judicial review of
agency actions; just as some commentators have called the APA
a constitution," others have claimed that it simply restates a
common law of administrative procedure.5 9 If the heyday of making federal common law reflected a willingness to permit the
transfer of legislative power from Congress to the courts,60 then
the recognition of an expansive common law power in federal
agencies seemingly would affect a similar transfer from both the
legislature and the courts to the executive branch.
This conception differs from the constitutional metaphor insofar as the responsibility for interpretation rests with the agency
itself rather than the judiciary.6 1 If agencies have such a com57. A few scholars have defended a common law method of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).
58. See supra note 34; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing that federal statutes
"should-like the Constitution and the common law-be interpreted 'dynamically,'
that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context"); Peter L.
Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 240-43 (1999)
(arguing that legislative enactments, as well as judicial interpretations, resemble the
common law process of judging insofar as they are reactive, pragmatic, and evolving
adjustments of existing rules).
59. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 130-38 (1998)
(criticizing this view); cf. Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 1819-22 (1999) (rejecting the argument that a distinct common law standard of review in patent cases
survived the enactment of the APA). For a critique of one particular application of
this notion to justify an innovative short-cut for issuing agency regulations that is
not explicitly authorized by the APA, see Lars Noah, Doubts About Direct Final
Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (1999).
60. See Duffy, supra note 59, at 138; see also infra Part II.B (discussing federal
common law).
61. In some respects, it would resemble the role played by the separate administrative judiciary (Conseil d'Etat) in France, which has developed something of an
administrative common law, while a civil code governs much of private law in that
and other continental legal regimes. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL,
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 288-95 (5th ed. 1998); Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An
Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 57, 67-76 (1994); Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in
France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 385-87 (1982); Martin A.
Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME.
L. REv. 21, 75-77 (1997); Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19
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mon law power, then Article III courts apparently would have
essentially no supervisory role to play, just as the federal courts
generally may not review the merits of state common law or
statutory decisions absent some constitutional objection. 2 Indeed,
one commentator recently has suggested that state agencies
should receive Chevron deference when they must implement
federal regulatory programs, 63 an idea that seems to comport
nicely with the common law metaphor for enabling acts but also
may highlight some of its intrinsic weaknesses, as. elaborated in

Part II.
Professor Sunstein defends Chevron for leaving essentially
political judgments about the interpretation of ambiguous statutes in the hands of agencies on several familiar grounds: Congress implicitly delegated such power to an agency, 64 and agencies enjoy greater democratic accountability and technical expertise than do the courts. 65 Even if one accepts this strong reading

YALE J. INTL L. 81, 100 (1994).

62. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) ("Neither this Court nor any
other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State."); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 n.8 (1987) (holding that the federal courts are bound by a
state court's interpretation of a state regulation); Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that a federal court sitting in
diversity was obligated to follow the state supreme court's apparent misinterpretation of a state statute); see also Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress's Power to Direct State JudicialAction: Congress's Power to Compel
State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State Law, 31 CONN. L. REv. 649, 65072 (1999) (canvassing the scholarly commentary and the case law on the federal
courts' practice of certifying questions of unclear state law, including the meaning of
statutes, to state courts for authoritative guidance); cf. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520
U.S. 518, 522-23 (1997) (reiterating the rule that the Supreme Court lacks certiorari
jurisdiction to review a state court's judgment that rests on an adequate and independent state law ground); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (same).
63. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 (1999) ("[T]he very point of cooperative federalism
schemes-and the argument for deference to state agencies-is to allow states to
adopt the approach that they deem to be the optimal regulatory strategy... whenever the statutory scheme authorizes them to make that decision in the first instance."); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999) (noting
that the Telecommunications Act of 1996's "attendant legal questions, such as whether
federal courts must defer to state agency interpretations of federal law, are novel").
64. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1056 (calling this "[t]he central idea behind
Chevron").
65. See id. at 1056-58; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
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of Chevron, an issue taken up at greater length below, deference
to reasonable agency interpretations of any ambiguities in their
enabling statutes need not also mean, as Professor Sunstein now
suggests, recognizing their power to adapt these acts "to new circumstances and new social understandings."6 6 Whereas courts
encounter disputes about statutory meaning episodically and
acontextually, agencies live with their enabling acts and make
interpretive judgments on a daily basis.67 Such immersion can
represent both a virtue and a vice when questions arise about
the limitations on an agency's power.

II. FLAWS IN THE LOOSE CONCEPTIONS OF AGENCY
ENABLING STATUTES
This Part asks whether, and to what extent, the courts should
condone bureaucratic tendencies toward the expansion of their
delegated powers. First, it argues that judicial scrutiny of agency
behavior remains necessary to ensure fidelity to their enabling
statutes. Second, it contends that the same flaws inherent in
recognizing the power of a federal court to make common law
based on nothing more than a grant of subject matter jurisdiction apply with equal force to agencies. Finally, this Part refutes
the claim that Chevron deference should extend to the review of
"jurisdictional" questions. Courts must continue to take juris-

U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("[Plractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.").
66. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1056. Notably, Professor Sunstein previously had
criticized the Chevron decision. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 465-69 (1987); see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of
the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1229-32 (1988); Abner J.
Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1,

6-9 (1986).
67. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read. Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 327-31, 334 (1990); id. at 329 (describing "[tihe organic nature of agency relationships with their statutes, that agencies essentially live the
process of statutory interpretation"); David R. Woodward & Ronald M. Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 332
(1979) (noting that agencies develop expertise in reading their enabling statutes due
to the "frequency of an agency's contact with the statute . .. [and] its immersion in
day-to-day administrative operations").
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dictional limitations seriously, whether they appear in the U.S.
Constitution, legislation specifying the scope of the federal judicial power, or an agency's enabling statute.6" The common law
and, to a lesser extent, constitutional metaphors inappropriately
disregard the need to police the outer boundaries of administrative power.
A. Policing the Most DangerousBranch: Judicial Supervision of
Delegations
In contrast to the analogy drawn to corporate charters, the
constitutional metaphor seeks to justify broad flexibility in defining the limits of an agency's power, and the common law
metaphor would provide agencies with an apparently boundless
range for operation. To be sure, the judiciary has given Congress
substantial leeway under the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article I of the Constitution to embellish and expand upon its
specifically enumerated powers.6 9 Even so, whatever latitude it

68. See Epstein, supra note 39, at 1390-91 ("Provisions [of the Constitution] that
go to the question of jurisdiction are no less important to sound governance than
those that govern individual rights..... [J]urisdictional limitations [are] an important, indeed, indispensable, limitation upon government power."); id. at 1396 ("The
looseness of vague grants of power would have given rise to the possibility of massive abuse, a possibility the framers seemed determined to control. The federal government was to have supremacy in the areas under its control, but the quid pro quo
was that these areas were to be limited by specific jurisdictional grants."); see also
LEA BRIIAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
15 (1986) (describing jurisdictional questions as boundaries between courts and legislatures-at the state and federal level-designed to maintain a balance of power);
Steven G. Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 802-06 (1995) (urging courts to
police the boundaries between federal and state lawmaking).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 407-21 (1819); id. at 421 ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923
(1997) ("[The last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,
[is] the Necessary and Proper Clause."); Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44
UCLA L. REV. 745, 776-77, 791-93 (1997) (arguing that, rather than being used to
allow an expansion of the legislature's enumerated powers, the Necessary and Proper
Clause should be used as a standard against which to judge particular exercises of
its enumerated powers); Epstein, supra note 39, at 1397-99 (defining the role of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as administrative in nature, "to ensure that the Con-
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has accorded to Congress, the Court has given the President less
free range of operation. As the agent charged by the Constitution with "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"7 °
the President enjoys only limited authority to deviate from the
wishes of the legislative branch. Although the Court has recognized that the President must have certain implied emergency
powers, the exercise of such powers must comport with and not
contravene statute 7 1 and the President may not instruct execu-

gress shall have all means at its disposal to reach the heads of power that admittedly fall within its grasp," rather than authoritative, as an "automatic trump");
Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and GreaterPowers: A Separability
Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 519 (1995) ("Since a Constitution simply cannot
list every permissible government action, we must infer some powers from those
explicitly granted. Powers that are constituent elements of explicitly granted powers
would seem to be at the core of implied, powers."); Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 331-32 (1993) (defending a strict construction of
the clause, with an emphasis on the word "proper" as a jurisdictional limitation designed to protect the states against encroachments by Congress if it attempted to
assert unenumerated powers).
70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153,
1177 n.119 (1992) (conceding that the President does not enjoy inherent authority to
act contrary to statute); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-32 (1993) (documenting presidential assertions of a power
to contravene statutory law and the judiciary's rejection of these attempts).
71. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-87 (1981) (upholding executive orders establishing an Iranian claims tribunal to secure the release of American
hostages); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952)
(plurality opinion) (invalidating the President's attempted seizure of domestic steel
mills during the Korean War); id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). The Justices
dissenting in Youngstown thought that President Truman could seize the steel mills
so long as Congress had not specifically prohibited such action. See id. at 701-03
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting). But cf. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the
President's Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 31-32, 51 (1982) (warning that, "if
the President could take any action that is compatible on its face with a statutory
purpose, the practical consequence would be the adoption of Theodore Roosevelt's
expansive theory that the President may take any action not forbidden by law"). See
generally LouIs FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE

PRESIDENT (4th ed. rev. 1997); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CI. L. REV. 123, 182-96 (1994); Lars Noah, The
Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What's the Difference?, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 235 (1999) (drawing parallels between the power exercised by
the President under the Line Item Veto Act, which the Supreme Court found violative of the Presentment Clause, and the judiciary's readiness to sever invalidated
provisions, from statutes).
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live officers to ignore legislative instructions.7 2 Thus, the courts
demand executive fidelity to legislation and recognize only limited
extrastatutory powers inherent in the Constitution.
Concerns about agency tendencies toward expansion have long
existed.7 3 Although perhaps more apt as a gauge for legislative
rather than administrative behavior, the insights of public
choice theory suggest that agency officials may act to further
their self-interest, whether by aggrandizing their own powers or
placating powerful interest groups.7 4 As Professor Sunstein con-

72. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610-13
(1838); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-71 (1803) (distinguishing
between political powers vested in the President and ministerial duties imposed on
executive branch officers by the legislature); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983) ("[U]nlike the legislature, administrative agencies can never pretend to an unlimited power to select among
goals; the universe of each agency is limited by the legislative specifications contained in its organic act."); id. at 33 (noting similarities in the deferential judicial
review of ultra vires challenges to both administrative and legislative acts).
73. See Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting
"the unspoken premise that government agencies have a tendency to swell, not
shrink, and are likely to have an expansive view of their mission"); Lubrizol Corp. v.
EPA, 562 F.2d 807, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (mentioning the "seemingly growing popular
conviction that government agencies too often transgress the statutorily imposed
boundaries of their authority"); WMILLJIA

A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REP-

RESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 5-12 (1971); Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the
Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1113-19 (1954).

These general fears go back centuries. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It will not be denied that power is of an
encroaching nature and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the
limits assigned to it."); CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT

OF LAWS, bk. xi, ch. 4, at 200 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Berkeley, Univ. of Cal.
Press 1977) (1750) (explaining that "constant experience sh[o]ws us, that every man
invested with power is apt to abuse it; he pushes on till he comes to the utmost
limit").

74. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 51 (1982) ("Budget maximizing, jurisdictional expansion, and output maximizing in their various manifestations may increase private payoffs to agency personnel."); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 207, 248 (1984); cf. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46
J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 496 (1996) (summarizing the limitations of public choice theory
in predicting the behavior of unelected officials). These tendencies are, of course,
offset by competing regulatory demands and resource constraints. See Lars Noah &
Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food Additive Approval
Process, 78 B.U. L. REV. 329, 421 & n.409, 433, 443 (1998) (noting that the FDA is
"struggling to do more with fewer resources").
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cedes, "both the vulnerability of agencies to factions and the
interest of agencies in increasing their own power and authority
argue against the common law analogy; at least common law
judges had, and have, the virtues of comparative independence." 5 During the last quarter of a century, for instance, the
FDA has been notoriously creative in construing its own statutory
authority, most recently in announcing that it would control
human cloning experiments.7 6 Some might congratulate the
agency for its adaptability to changing circumstances, but others
have credibly accused it of overreaching. 7 As explained in the
sections that follow, administrative tendencies toward expansion
of agency jurisdiction and power generally should be condemned
rather than applauded.

76. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1061. He concludes, however, that "[w]hen compared with common law courts, agencies have a greater understanding of relevant
facts, and they also have a degree of political responsiveness, which is a virtue as
well as a potential vice." Id. at 1061-62.
76. See Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 641 (1998) (disputing the FDA's claim that it already enjoys sufficient statutory authority to assert jurisdiction to restrict human
cloning research); see also Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical
Devices: DistinguishingNonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 806, 831-50 (1993) (discussing the FDA's creativity
in using its power to regulate medical devices to reach other types of products).
Companies apparently have begun serious work to clone human embryos for applied
fetal tissue research. See Rick Weiss, Embryo Work Raises Specter of Human Harvesting: Medical Research Teams Draw Closer to Cloning, WASH. POST, June 14,
1999, at Al.
77. See, e.g., 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) ("In our
anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must
take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress
indicated it would stop."); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir.
1956) ('The record of the past few decades is replete with examples of the tendency
of executive agencies to expand their field of operations. A passion and a zeal to
crusade affects their operations."); H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A
Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the suggestion that "a well-motivated administrative agency can legally do what it alone deems
desirable unless Congress has in advance specifically prohibited it"); Lars Noah,
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of CongressionalDelegations of Authority,
1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 911-12 (observing that the FDA's traditional practice of interpreting its enabling statute expansively "carries with it opportunities for abuse");
Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to
Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 AA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1996) ('The FDA should not be
free to ignore the outer boundaries of its delegated authority in pursuit of a wellmeaning crusade against a public health problem.").
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1. The Remnants of the Nondelegation Doctrine
For a brief time during the New Deal, the United States Supreme Court employed the nondelegation doctrine to strike down
sweeping federal legislation. 8 The Court soon retreated from the
extreme position suggested in these opinions and subsequently
upheld broad delegations of legislative authority to administrative agencies.79 Although most courts and commentators regard
the rule against delegation as a dead letter," some have called
for its reinvigoration."' At most, however, the nondelegation doctrine has become a justification for narrowly construing such
78. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
79. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1947); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943);
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574-78 (1939); see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-59, 771 (1996) (upholding the delegation of
power to the President to prescribe aggravating factors in military capital cases);
Skinner v. MidAmerica Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 219-24 (1989) (rejecting the claim
that granting an agency the authority to impose user fees amounted to an impermissible delegation of Congress's taxing power); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 379 (1989) (upholding the delegation of rulemaking power to the United States
Sentencing Commission).
80. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S: 417, 469 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe doctrine of unconstitutional delegais preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities."); id. at 485-86 (Breyer, J.,
tion ...
dissenting) ("Indeed, the Court has only twice in its history found that a congressional delegation of power violated the 'nondelegation' doctrine."); Federal Power
Comm'n v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part) ("The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power of Congress to delegate authority to administrative agencies, which was briefly in vogue in
This doctrine is surely
the 1930's, has been virtually abandoned by the Court ....
").
as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era . .
81. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Aranson et al., supra note
74, at 63-67; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]e
must be particularly rigorous in preserving the Constitution's structural restrictions
that deter excessive delegation."); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) ('We ought
not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of
legislative authority solely out of concern that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New Deal era."); Thomas 0. Sargentich,
The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM.
U. L. REv. 419, 419-20 (1987) (arguing that the doctrine deserves serious attention
even though courts rarely invoke it). See generally Symposium, The Phoenix Rises
Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20
CARDOzO L. REV. 731 (1999).
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broad delegations to federal officials, 82 a technique that makes
sense only if the courts then intend to monitor agency action for
consistency with their more restrictive interpretation of such
statutes.83 As Judge Harold Leventhal once wrote: "Congress has
been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly-and
courts have upheld such delegation-because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power
within statutory limits ....

84

Agencies routinely must implement incompletely specified
statutory commands. As the Supreme Court explained one de-

82. See Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 646 (plurality opinion); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 129 (1958); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7; cf. American Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (rejecting a
broad EPA interpretation of the Clean Air Act because it created a nondelegation
problem), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3496 (Feb. 8, 2000) (Nos. 99-1257, 991263 & 99-1265); Central Forwarding, Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1284 (5th Cir.
1983) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of the Commission's jurisdiction, and
warning that to "constru[e] the National Transportation Policy, which paraphrased
says little more than 'go forth and do good,' as a congressional grant of rulemaking
authority might well amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority").
83. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MATON, ADMmSTRATIVE LAW §
1.2.1, at 28 (1993) (explaining that the use of the nondelegation doctrine to construe
enabling statutes narrowly helps "prevent power from growing, this time according to
bureaucratic tendencies to expand their turf" by "requir[ing that the courts be especially mindful about exactly how much power Congress has delegated to an agency");
Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 189 (1992) ("Historically, the acceptance
of broad delegations has rested in part on the assumption that agency action is
subject to meaningful judicial review. To the extent Chevron is interpreted as letting
the agency itself determine the consistency of its action with the terms of the delegation, it destroys this premise." (footnote omitted)).
84. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) ("The claim of undue delegation of legislative power broadly raises the challenge of undue power in the Executive and thus naturally involves consideration of the interrelated questions of the
availability of appropriate restraints through provisions for administrative procedure
and judicial review."); id. at 745 ("An agency assigned to a task has its freedom of
action circumscribed ...
by the perimeters described by the legislature as
hedgerows defining areas open to the agency."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 143 ("If
agencies are able to interpret ambiguities in these [broad statutory] directives, the
delegation problem increases dramatically."); Monaghan, supra note 72, at 26 (suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine would "prohibit[], for example, a legislative
scheme that is tantamount to making the agency interpretation of the reach of its
statutory mandate wholly conclusive upon the courts").
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cade ago, "our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete
with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives."85 Although Congress typically delegates fairly sweeping substantive responsibilities to agencies,
modern enabling statutes often limit the allowable range of
regulatory methods available to pursue these broad purposes.8 6
Moreover, agencies cannot impose sanctions on regulated entities unless specifically authorized by statute.8 The APA also
provides that "a substantive rule" may not be "issued except
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency,"" a provision that

85. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; see also id. at 379 ("Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is
precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert
body is especially appropriate."); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194
(1941) (noting that Congress deals with the impossibility of anticipating every violation of an Act by entrusting an expert agency with its administration); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985) (applauding broad delegations as allowing agencies to
adapt to changing circumstances and voter preferences).
86. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 985
(1999); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A
Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175,
177-82 (1992); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819,
821-45 (explaining that Congress has become more precise in its recent delegations,
especially in the environmental area); Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency
Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward
the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 479, 518 (1995) ("IT]he popular notion of unconfined delegation is a
myth ....
Congress virtually always prescribes policy structures in sufficient detail
so that agency choice of regulatory method is narrowed significantly.").
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1994) ("A sanction may not be imposed ...
except
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law."); SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1978) (holding that an enabling statute did not authorize a series of summary suspension orders).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b); see also H.R. REP. No. 79-1980 (1946), reprinted in U.S.
GOV'T ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. No. 79-248,
at 233, 274 (1946) ("An agency authorized to regulate only trade practices may not
regulate banking, and so on. Similarly, no agency may undertake directly or indirectly to exercise the functions of some other agency. The section confines each agency
to the jurisdiction delegated to it by law."); id. at 275 ("It has never been the policy
of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially
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has received essentially no attention by the courts or commentators,8 9 perhaps because they think that it merely restates the
obvious. The Florida legislature recently codified a more emphatic constraint of this sort on the rulemaking authority of
agencies in that state. 90
2. HonoringLegislative Supremacy
The principle of legislative supremacy attempts to ensure that
only Congress may enact or amend a statute. 91 From this perspective, enabling acts more closely resemble charters for agencies, and the courts must invalidate actions taken beyond the
range of that statutory jurisdiction. 92 Administrative agencies
confined to the scope of authority granted ....

[Otherwise,] statutes would in effect

be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board."); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-

DURE ACT 88 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1979) (1947) ("The purpose of [Section 558(b)]
is, evidently, to assure that agencies will not appropriate to themselves powers Congress has not intended them to exercise."). Anticipating the discussion of the power
of the federal courts to fashion common law, see infra Part II.B, one might analogize
this APA provision to the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
89. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul R. Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations,
20 CARDOzO L. REv. 989, 994 n.28 (1999) ("This often overlooked provision articulates an independent APA ground for scrutinizing jurisdictional decisions."); id. at
1012 & n.121 (same).
90. See FLA. STAT. ch. 120.52(8) (1999) ("An agency may adopt only rules that
implement or interpret the specific powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably
related to the purpose of the enabling legislation .

. . .");

see also Department of

Bus. & Profl Regulation v. Calder Race Course, Inc., 724 So. 2d 100, 102-03 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (construing a slightly different earlier version of this provision);
St. Johns River Water Management Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So.
2d 72, 77-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (same); cf. Jim Rossi, 'Statutory
Nondelegation": Learning from Florida's Recent Experience in Administrative Procedure Reform, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 301 (1999) (criticizing this approach).
91. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations
is limited to the authority delegated by Congress."); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 317-18 (1989); Edward
L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLurM. L. REv. 369,
4P2 (1989); see also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996) (rejecting an
agency's effort to override a prior judicial interpretation, which only Congress could
do). The Constitution only empowers the President to "recommend" to Congress
"such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (instructing reviewing courts to "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action" found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
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can no more amend their own organic statutes than the President or Congress could unilaterally amend the U.S. Constitution
outside of the strictures of Article V.93
Under a once dominant conception of administrative law, agencies enjoyed only as much power as Congress chose to delegate
and could utilize only those procedures set forth in their enabling statutes, with courts serving as a backstop to ensure that
agencies abided by these substantive and procedural constraints. 4 Although other paradigms now compete with what
some commentators have described as the rule-of-law ideal, none
have fully replaced it,95 and apparently all of them would con-

limitations, or short of statutory right" (emphasis added)); see also Federal Labor
Relations Auth. v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 485 U.S. 409, 414 (1988); Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373
(1986) (invalidating the Federal Reserve Board's effort to exercise jurisdiction over
certain nonbank acquisitions); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979);
Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944) ("When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of
those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted ....
The responsibility of
determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in such instances is a judicial
function entrusted to the courts by Congress . . . ."); Transohio Say. Bank v. Office
of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1992); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO
GUARDS THE GUARDiANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 55 (1988) ("Admin-

istrative agencies may do lawfully only what congressional statutes authorize them
to do.").
93. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that constitutional amendments first be proposed by a two-thirds vote of either both houses of Congress or the states and then
be ratified by three-fourths of the states); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory
of Article V The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 677, 682, 721-63 (1993); see also Tribe, supra note 38, at 1241-45, 1282-301
(responding to various claims that the Constitution may be "amended" in a manner
not provided for by Article V). But cf 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 15, 66-67 (1998) (postulating alternative methods of amendment);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed. ConstitutionalAmendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLIJM. L. REV. 457, 462-94 (1994) (providing historical and textual
arguments to suggest that Article V is not the exclusive mechanism for constitutional
amendment).
94. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76 (1975) (elaborating on the "traditional model" of administrative law).
95. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV.
505, 512 (1985) (arguing that the courts recently turned away from an interest representation model in favor of "an expanded notion of fidelity, one that requires not
only that the agencies not exceed their congressionally authorized powers, but also
that they use those powers as Congress intended"); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern
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demn efforts by agencies to arrogate undelegated power. Although it may have appropriately reduced the threat of judicial
supremacy, Chevron did not entirely undermine the tradition of
legislative supremacy by ushering in a preference for executive
supremacy.
The acceptance of either the constitutional or the common law
metaphor to describe an agency's enabling statute would result
in a significant shift in the balance of power between the three
branches of government. 6 Within broad limits, agencies could
pursue any goal by any means not explicitly prohibited by Con-

Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 646,
666-68, 703 (1988) (arguing in support of continued judicial review to ensure agency
conformity to statute); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Debate, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 385, 397-404, 441-42
(describing the rule-of-law ideal, which "permeates administrative law," as well as its
limitations, and concluding that it remains "robust" even while it competes with
alternative paradigms); Werhan, supra note 34, at 570 ("All approaches to administrative law which have prevailed from time to time in this country embody the core
components of the traditional model."); id. at 626-27 (arguing in favor of a return to
the traditional model). But see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1333-34 (1999) (assailing the conventional wisdom); id. at 1288-89, 1302 (doubting that judicial review is a necessary
check on administrative ambitions).
96. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLM. L. REV. 452, 464-65 (1989) ("Once these considerable power-shifting implications are recognized, the choice between independent
judgment and deference becomes part of the vexing larger problem of managing the
power generated by regulatory statutes."); id. at 476 n.98 ("One way to appreciate
the magnitude of the step is to imagine that Congress enacts a statute requiring the
Supreme Court to defer to the view of the Solicitor General whenever it encounters
an unclear point of federal law."); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 425 ("Although the elimination of unnecessary legal formalism in agency decisionmaking is a salutary goal for reform efforts, . . . we are in
danger of pushing delegalization so far that we lose sight of the legal values that
make administrative government acceptable in a system of checks and balances.");
see also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Power
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 833-34 (1991) (arguing that the strong
reading of Chevron represents an unconstitutional transfer of judicial power to the
executive branch). A similar point has been made with respect to the long-standing
rule of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. See John F.
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996) ("If an agency's rules mean whatever it says they mean (unless the reading is plainly erroneous), the agency effectively has the power of self-interpretation."); Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent:
The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2000).
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gress. In commenting on the Supreme Court's decision in'Rust v.
Sullivan, Professor Keith Werhan explained that:
The Rust decision represents a complete reversal of the traditional model of administrative law. Under the ultra vires
principle that animates the model, as translated by legal process theory, the responsibility would be on HHS to show that
its prohibition on abortion advocacy, counseling, and referral
was consistent with the congressional purpose underlying the
Act and the funding restriction. The utter silence in the legislative record that anyone contemplated or desired that HHS
prohibit these activities by funding recipients would be disabling, not empowering.98
The consequence, as he explained, is that "the agency replaced
Congress as the initiator of regulatory policy, and... Congress
must replace the Court as a check on agency decisioninaking,"
but the President's likely veto would force Congress to secure
supermajorities if it wanted to demand fidelity to its original
enactment.9 9 Should agencies really become the final arbiters of

97. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In this case, the Court upheld the "abortion gag rule,"
noting that Congress had not specifically prohibited such a restriction on federal
funding of family-planning clinics. See id. at 184-85.
98. Werhan, supra note 34, at 622 (footnote omitted); see also Thomas v. INS, 35
F.3d 1332, 1348 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the use
of common law agency principles of implied authority for federal officers, asking,
"Would Congress have to load committee reports with lists of powers not implicitly
delegated to various government officials?").
99. Werhan, supra note 34, at 622; see also Gelihorn & Verkuil, supra note 89, at
1004 ("M[The attitude that an agency may do whatever is necessary even though it is
not directly authorized to do so is lawless, not merely creative."); Hirshman, supra
note 95, at 674-75 (objecting to the "erroneous identification of judicial review of
agency action for conformity to law with judicial review of legislation for its constitutionality," pointing out that the former does not pose the majoritarian problems of
the latter because the courts are not asked to override the judgment of a coordinate,
elected branch of government, and adding that, "unlike the troublesome open-textured provisions of the Constitution, realistically, most statutes offer the courts a
substantially restricted sphere for creativity"); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986 DUKE L.J.
258, 261 ("It is unhealthy to assume, even as a theoretical starting point, that agencies that possess [a broad grant of discretionary authority] should generally be free
to behave exactly as they please." (footnote omitted)); cf. Forsyth, supra note 21, at
123 ("[To abandon the [ultra vires] doctrine implies the abandonment of legislative
supremacy. Such a profound change in the constitutional order, should not, it will be
argued, be undertaken by the judiciary [in England] of their own motion."); id. at
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the meaning of their enabling statutes? Indeed, are organic acts
better understood as "disabling" statutes, creating constraints
-as state constitutions often do-on the exercise of inherent
governmental authority? Congress rarely includes explicit prohibitions on the scope of a federal agency's authority to regulate,
sometimes called "zipper clauses," as a counterweight to fears
about expansions in jurisdiction, 0 but the failure to impose
such limits should not mean that Congress intended to give
agencies carte blanche.
These questions replay the struggle between formalism and
functionalism in the separation of powers context, 10 ' though on a
microscale. Formalism, used as a prophylactic bright-line test
that eschews balancing in cases where one branch appears to be
aggrandizing itself or usurping power from another branch, 1 2

137 (concluding that judicial use of the ultra vires doctrine "marks the maintenance
of the proper balance of powers between the elected and non-elected parts of the
constitution").
100. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CmE.L. REV. 533, 537
(1983). The Consumer Product Safety Act provides one example. See 15 U.S.C. §§
2052(a)(1), 2080(a) (1994) (restricting the Consumer Product Safety Commission's
authority to regulate certain consumer product risks that fall within the jurisdiction
of other specified agencies).
101. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1732-44 (1996); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers
and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 474, 503-04 (1989); Peter L. Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 510-26 (1987). See generally Symposium,
The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 209 (1989).
102. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998) (crediting "powerful
reasons for construing constitutional silence on this profoundly important issue
[permitting the President to exercise a line item veto] as equivalent to an express
prohibition"); Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) ("The result may appear 'formalistic' in a
given case . .. [,] [blut the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It
divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient
solution to the crisis of the day."); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986) ("Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch."); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of
the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be resisted."); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If
Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers
Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 476-78 (1991); see also Tribe, supra note 38, at 1248
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may have stronger justification as a basis for trying to cabin
administrative tendencies toward the expansion of jurisdiction.
Agencies may issue legislative rules and help adjudicate disputes subject to certain limitations, 3 but the Constitution vests
the "judicial power" in the federal courts,1 °4 and the Supreme
Court has characterized the interpretation of specific con05
gressional intent as a "quintessential lyl judicial function."'
The common law metaphor for agency enabling acts would turn
this allocation of decision-making responsibility on its head,
while the constitutional metaphor may lead judges to give short
shrift to fairly specific legislative directions about the intended
limits of an agency's power.
Although Congress can more easily correct agency misinterpretations of federal legislation than it can initiate constitutional
amendments to permit some innovative form of governmental
activity, a more formal insistence on agency fidelity to statute
would place the onus on Congress to make its wishes reasonably
clear in advance rather than expect it to serve a negative checking function on overzealous agency officials and overly forgiving
judges. 6 Otherwise, one sacrifices legislative supremacy in or("For the Constitution to serve as a constitutive document, some provisions require
rigid definition; not all may be given a wide berth for evolution."); id. at 1248 n.91
(defending "an insistence on reading enabling provisions in a relatively rigid manner").
103. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 847-58; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473
U.S. 568, 592-93 (1985); Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1062-89 (1999).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1. Many formalists would, however, defend a strong
reading of Chevron as a legitimate aspect of the executive power vested in the President and subordinate executive officers. My reference in the text to formalist approaches to the constitutional separation of powers has less to do with attempts to
pigeonhole the specific powers exercised by government officials than with an insistence on strictly enforcing text-based limits on the extent of their powers.
105. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
325 (1992) (explaining that "the Constitution invests the Judiciary, not the Legislature, with the final power to construe the law"); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 315 (1980); Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ("An agency
may not finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function.").
is emphatiThis comports with Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement that "[ilt
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
106. On the relative difficulty of legislating to override judicial misinterpretations of
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der to promote administrative expediency. Unless Congress expressly made such a choice and did not overstep the outer limits
of the nondelegation doctrine, the APA's preference for jurisdictional fidelity and judicial supervision creates the most plausible
system of checks and balances, not unlike the dynamic equilibrium
established by the Constitution itself."7 As creatures of statutes
lacking any independent constitutional pedigree, agencies cannot
invoke some kind of inherent authority to justify actions that
find no warrant in their enabling legislation.
3. The Difficulty of PrecludingJudicialReview
Agencies sometime pursue results without much attention to
the niceties of legal constraints on their missions; consequently,
courts serve an essential checking function.' °8 In response to the
above argument concerning legislative supremacy, proponents of
the constitutional and common law metaphors would respond
that they honor congressional preferences in abiding by implicit
delegations to agencies of the power to interpret the meaning of
their enabling statutes. The implicit delegation rationale said to
underlie Chevron, at least according to those who favor a strong
form of deference, has serious shortcomings as a default assumption about the probable intent of Congress. Indeed, the subsequent behavior of the legislative branch in supervising agencies-ranging from formal oversight and consideration of appropriations requests to informal casework by individual members

a statute, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 416 (1991) (concluding that Congress should "be
concerned that its monitoring of Supreme Court statutory decisions yields few
overrides"); John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275 &
n.25, 1281 (1996).
107. See Farina, supra note 96, at 497.
108. See LoUIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATiVE ACTION 323 (1965)
("From the point of view of an agency, the question of the legitimacy of its action is
secondary to that of the positive solution of a problem ....
[T~he maintenance of
legitimacy requires a judicial body independent of the active administration."); see
also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring)
("[Judicial review perfects a delegated-lawmaking scheme by assuring that the exercise of such power remains within statutory bounds."); Monaghan, supra note 72, at
7 (explaining that "our tradition is that the court's role is simply to keep the administrative agencies within the boundaries of delegated power").
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on behalf of constituents-cuts against the notion that Congress
grants agencies unreviewable powers of statutory interpretation.
At the very least, the prevalence of such practices belies the
suggestion that enabling acts enjoy the same dignity as relatively
immutable constitutional texts whose contours generally are not
shaped by subsequent political negotiations.
Imagine that Congress had decided to strip the courts of authority to review agency actions for consistency with its enabling
act."°9 As the Supreme Court has demonstrated in the past,
resistance is likely, particularly in response to efforts aimed at
precluding review of constitutional questions,"0 but also with respect to statutory issues."' "We ordinarily presume that Congress intends the executive to obey its statutory commands and,
accordingly, that it expects the courts to grant relief when an
executive agency violates such a command."" 2 Where judicial
review of statutory (ultra vires) claims is unavailable, litigants
have tried without success to recast these in constitutional

109. In commonwealth countries, these provisions are called "ouster" clauses. See
Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England and
the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 645-48 (1986); Paul R. Verkuil,
Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 685,
694-96 (1986).
110. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S.
99, 109 (1977); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-73 (1974); see also Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-62 (1975) (allowing partial preclusion of judicial review
where parties retained a right to present constitutional challenges in a different
setting); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (summarizing this
pattern of resistance).
111. See Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 (1993); Traynor v.
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 54145 (1988); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management,
470 U.S. 768, 791 (1985); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-90 (1958) (holding that
a preclusion provision did not prevent review of an ultra vires challenge); see also
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 42-44
(1991) (allowing partial preclusion of judicial review of ultra vires challenge to regulation, thereby distinguishing Kyne); Evergreen State College v. Cleland, 621 F.2d
1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that preclusion provision did not prevent review
of an agency's authority to issue regulations); cf. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 40915 (1977) (finding unmistakable evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial
review of the legality of certifications or other determinations by the attorney general
under the Voting Rights Act).
112. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 (1986).
Restrictive standing doctrine would, however, limit this review function. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
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terms. 113 Even so, if agency action did not spring from authority
delegated by the enabling act, then any express preclusion of
judicial review found in the enabling act might not apply." 4
Chevron did not extend the political question doctrine, which
directs courts not to review the exercise of discretion by the
executive or legislative branch when the Constitution delegates
such discretion," 5 to agencies when they implement their en113. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) ("Our cases do not support
the proposition that every action by the President, or by another executive official,
in excess of his statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution.").
But see Larry Alexander & Evan Tsen Lee, Is There Such a Thing as Extraconstitutionality?: The Puzzling Case of Dalton v. Specter, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845
(1995) (criticizing this aspect of Dalton); Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations
on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV. 733, 751-53, 774-75 & n.159 (1983)
(suggesting that ultra vires challenges, though not of constitutional dimension, share
similarities with the latter so that statutory preclusion should not necessarily prevent judicial review in such cases).
114. See Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 638 n.17 (1978)
([Clourts have jurisdiction to review suspension orders to the limited extent necessary to ensure that such orders do not overstep the bounds of Commission authority.");
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 282-85 (1978) (holding that a
preclusion provision will not apply until the government meets its burden of proving
that the regulation falls within the agency's statutory authority); see also Dart v.
United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("When an executive acts ultra
vires, courts are normally available to reestablish the limits on his authority. Rarely,
if ever, has Congress withdrawn courts' jurisdiction to correct such lawless behavior . . . ."); NLRB Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 834 F.2d 191, 195-97
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining to apply a statute of limitations for challenging rules to
bar an ultra vires objection); Forsyth, supra note 21, at 130 (explaining that, under
English precedents, "it was clear that if the regulations were ultra vires, judicial review would not be precluded by the ouster clause").
115. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228-38 (1993) (invoking the political
question doctrine to decline reviewing the manner of impeachment proceedings);
United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59 (1992) (rejecting
application of the doctrine in a challenge to a reapportionment decision); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1973) (declining to invade "critical areas of responsibility
vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (suggesting that judicial review is
inappropriate when there is, among other things, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it"). The question
concerning whether the Constitution should be understood as lodging such unreviewable discretion in a political branch must itself remain subject to judicial interpretation. See id. at 211 ("Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of
that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court . . . ."); see
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abling statutes. The APA does preclude review of decisions "committed to agency discretion by law,""' but the Supreme Court
has applied this provision grudgingly, finding preclusion of review on this basis in only quite limited cases.117 Thus, the strong
reading of Chevron that undergirds the common law metaphor
conflicts with the Court's deeply ingrained presumption of reviewability.
Just as it would be odd for the federal courts to abdicate their
function of reviewing the constitutionality of legislation to Congress, one would not expect the courts to cede their role of
ensuring that agency action finds authorization in statute. Congress does have the opportunity and some obligation to take
account of constitutional constraints,118 as does the President,"1

also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99-105 (1987) (objecting

to the political question doctrine insofar as it entrusts to a politically accountable
body the responsibility for enforcing a text designed to restrain it); Martin H.
Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 104550 (1984-1985) (same); id at 1060 ("[T]he Court must draw the final constitutional
calculus.").
116. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
117. See, e.g., Lincoln .v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192-94 (1993) (allocation of funds from
a lump-sum appropriation); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988) (termination
of a CIA employee thought to pose a security threat); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987) (refusal to grant a petition for reconsideration);
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-38 (1985) (decision not to take enforcement
action against drugs used for lethal injection); see also Webster, 486 U.S. at 608-09,
614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (drawing the parallel between 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and
the political question doctrine); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (holding that the APA precludes review only when there is no
law to apply); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 702-34 (1990) (elaborating on the Supreme Court's
evolving gloss on this basis for precluding judicial review); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675-83 (1985)
(explaining that the presumption of judicial reviewability continues to apply to a
variety of agency inaction).
118. See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 61-65, 82 (1986); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 743-47 (1985);
Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1122-23
(1988).
119. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1284-88, 1329-30 (1996); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
GEo. L.J. 217, 321-22 (1994); Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separa-
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and the courts sometimes take into consideration the interpretations of the Constitution tendered by their coequal branches, 2 0
but federal judges presumably would never treat such views as
conclusive or binding in the course of satisfying their Article III
duties. 21 Where Congress has asked courts to play the same role
vis-a-vis agencies, whether in the APA or an enabling statute,
the courts should not regard an agency's view as to the outer
limits of its delegated authority as definitive. Indeed, whatever
one may think about the competing interpretive authority concerning the Constitution exercised by the three branches of government, 2 2 little doubt should exist about the proper locus of

tion of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 137 (1993).
120. Moreover, several amendments to the Constitution contain enforcement clauses
delegating a power of implementation to Congress. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIH,
XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XXV, XXVI. The most notable of these has been Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 732-33 (1982); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651-56 (1966); see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 184 (1997) (arguing that the courts should extend
something like Chevron deference to Congress when it interprets the Constitution
under this section).
121. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990) ("[C]ongressional
consideration of constitutional questions does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny
of the law's constitutionality. On the contrary, this Court has the duty to review the
constitutionality of congressional enactments."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361-62 (1997) (arguing that
the judiciary should have the final word); Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 273 (1993) ("[Llegislatures are less disinterested than
courts when it comes to enforcing constitutional limits on government power....
[W]hen legislatures enforce constitutional guarantees they face an inherent conflict of
interest."); Lawson & Moore, supra note 119, at 1274-79 (distinguishing between
legal and epistemological deference, and explaining that courts may, but need not,
defer to interpretations of the Constitution by coordinate branches of government);
Paulsen, supra note 119, at 302, 321-22, 332-37 (arguing for executive review of
judicial rulings, but rejecting suggestions favoring executive supremacy); cf. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (rejecting a suggestion that state officials could ignore
judicial pronouncements on the constitutionality of their actions, and asserting that
"the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
This point is distinct from presumptions of constitutionality and highly deferential
minimum rationality review when courts resolve challenges to the substantive merits
of legislation as opposed to questions about the legislature's jurisdiction to act at all.
122. See generally Gary Apfel, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? The Authority of
the Judiciary's Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RTGERs L. REv. 771 (1994)
(providing a history of the competing views on this issue).
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interpretive authority concerning the scope of agency enabling
acts: Congress has vested it in the judiciary. Furthermore, particular enabling statutes do not receive the sustained interbranch and academic attention given to the U.S. Constitution, so
judicial abdication might leave agencies largely unsupervised in
this respect.
Thus, viewed from the perspective of judicial insistence on a
power to review certain types of objections to governmental
actions, the constitutional metaphor usefully helps to illustrate
the shortcomings of the common law metaphor. If courts retain
this review function, then the question remains as to the degree
of fidelity to demand to the enabling statute, whether narrow (in
the classical sense of a charter) or flexible (as with an adaptable
constitution).' Perhaps Chevron's two step analysis provides a
method for distinguishing between the broad, constitution-like
enabling statutes (where ambiguity is most likely) and the narrower, charter-like delegations that a court may resolve at step
one, 1 2 especially if the courts use textualism to find1 5clarity in
arguably ambiguous delegations from the legislature.

123. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasizing
that "we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding" as distinguished from a detailed code).
124. See Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106-07
(1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.); National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 86, at 523
("Congress almost always speaks at length to at least the primary questions of policy
design and structure, thus sharply limiting agency choice of regulatory method and
generally precluding the possibility of Chevron deference on those questions."); cf.
Easterbrook, supra note 100, at 544-47, 551-52 (contrasting broad enactments such
as the Sherman Act that invite courts to fashion common law with more precise
enactments whose gaps should not be filled); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T.
Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of
Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REv. 803, 869 (1994) ("[S]tatutory
schemes occupy the entire spectrum between simplicity and complexity, specificity
and abstraction.").
125. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479, 499-503 (1998); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-29
(1994); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1990);
see also Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 417-23 (1996) (refuting claims that
textualism has systematically distorted the Court's application of Chevron); Thomas
W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 366-73 (1994) (explaining why the ascendancy of textualism appears to be re-
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In the end, no single metaphor accurately captures the variety
of organic acts, and Congress may have shifted from the openended and aspirational delegations of earlier this century to the
somewhat more precise and constrained enabling statutes of
today. Nonetheless, the charter metaphor makes the most sense
as a default position. Even if some older enactments have more
of a constitution-like quality, one should not adopt this more forgiving perspective across the board when interpreting other
types of enabling statutes. Finally, even accepting some limited
role for the constitutional metaphor, the common law metaphor
has no legitimate place in thinking about how to interpret agency
enabling acts, as further elaborated below.
B. Reinterringthe Power to Make Federal Common Law
With the decline of a previously expansive notion of federal
authority to make common law in the courts,"2 6 the proposal to
locate a comparable power in administrative agencies should
arouse suspicion. The opportunity given agencies to revise interpretations of their enabling statute does, of course, resemble the
common law tradition of revisiting precedents when conditions
change,"' and the failure to defer where unforeseen circumstan-

ducing deference to agency interpretations).
126. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815,
856 (1997) ("Courts and scholars generally agree that federal common law must be
authorized in some fashion by the Constitution or a federal statute."); Lars Noah,
Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards
Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 974-75 (1996) ("[Clourts generally reserve the
development of federal common-law rules for extraordinary circumstances . .. ."
(footnotes omitted)); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 339 (1980) (arguing that federal common law is invalid "if it transgresses what the legislature intends by its implicit
delegation of lawmaking power to the courts").
127. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 416-20 (1993) (deferring
to an agency's latest interpretation of ambiguous statutory language even though its
interpretation apparently had changed over time); David M. Gossett, Comment,
Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U.
CHI. L. REv. 681, 704-05 (1997); cf. United States Dep't of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 340-41 (1999) (rejecting an agency's
revised interpretation of the Census Act as allowing statistical sampling, noting that
the agency had not argued for Chevron deference in light of its long history of inter-
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ces render an enabling statute's command anachronistic may
lead to absurd results. 128 Thus, in order to combat obsolescence
failed to rein antiquated enabling statutes that Congress has
19
function.
updating
some
enjoy
may
agencies
visit,
This freedom is not, however, unconstrained. Courts must still
determine whether a revised interpretation is reasonable, and
the negative checking function undertaken by judges when they
review agency interpretations of an enabling statute does not
mean that federal courts thereby have formulated a common law
based on the statute that could just as' easily be lodged in the
agency. 30 Where the Supreme Court itself has previously interpreted an enabling statute, an agency cannot disregard that
precedent.13' For similar reasons, courts have not generally empreting the statute to preclude sampling).
128. See Margaret Gilhooley, Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative
Purpose: The Interpretation of the Delaney Clause, 40 ADMN. L. REV. 267, 279-80
(1988); see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Ilt is a venerable principle that a
law will not be interpreted to produce absurd results."); cf. Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing the majority's "loose invocation of the 'absurd result' canon"). See
generally Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining
the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 127
(1994).
129. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1996) (extending
Chevron deference to the comptroller of the Currency's new regulation concerning the
treatment of credit card late-payment fees under the National Bank Act of 1864);
Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 718
(1987) (noting the role of judicial deference to agency interpretations of the GlassSteagall Act); cf. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) ("A
statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which
it is applied."); Robinson, supra note 48, at 178, 197-99 (discussing the obsolescence
of the Communications Act of 1934 and the obligation of Congress rather than the
FCC to update it in response to technological advances).
130. See MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 234 ("[Olur estimations, and the
Commission's estimations, of desirable policy cannot alter the meaning of the federal
Communications Act of 1934."); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380,
400 (1974) (concluding that the Commission lacked the authority to rely on market
prices even if the competitive structure of the natural gas industry had changed
significantly in the decades since passage of the relevant enabling statute because
this updating function properly belonged to Congress); cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 542-48 (1978) (rejecting a common law approach to dictating appropriate agency procedures).
131. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996); cf. Jahan Sharifi,
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braced agency nonacquiescence in prior judicial holdings.1 2 As
with judicial resistance to statutory preclusion of review, these
limitations on the range of permissible agency interpretations of
their organic acts suggest that the courts will continue jealously
to guard the judicial prerogative. As a descriptive thesis, therefore, Professor Sunstein's common law metaphor seems overstated. It fares even less well as a normative claim.
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 133 the Supreme Court declared emphatically that "[tihere is no federal general common
law,""s and it subsequently explained that "[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to
authority to formulate federal common law."" 5 Nonetheless, the
Comment, Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal Agencies After the
Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 252 (1993) (urging a modification to this limitation on the application of Chevron). In addition, where the agency
has previously interpreted one of its own regulations in a certain way, it cannot
simply revise such an interpretation as conditions change but must instead undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking to promulgate an amendment. See National
Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235-40 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
132. See Heckler v. Lopez, 464 U.S. 879, 887 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting that an agency "ha[d] not paid due respect to a coordinate branch of Government by expressly refusing to implement the binding decisions of the Ninth Circui");
Johnson v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("Intracircuit nonacquiescence has been condemned by almost every circuit court of
appeals that has confronted it."); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case
Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1339, 1388-432 (1991) (arguing that intracircuit nonacquiescence violates separation of powers principles); Erin
Margaret Masson, Note, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence on the Standard for Evaluating Pain, 36 WM.& MARY L. REV. 1819, 1840-53 (1995) (criticizing
this practice in one particular context); cf. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 718-53 (1989)
(generally defending the practice).
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134. Id. at 78; see also Gasperii v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 42631 (1996) (applying Erie); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting
that "we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating Erie"). The precise basis for
this conclusion remains obscure but has generated a wealth of academic commentary. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693
(1974); Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989); Henry
J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383 (1964).
135. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) (citation omitted) (declining to recognize a right of contribution in private antitrust litigation); see also Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-33 (1977) (declining to gen-
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Court has crafted a variety of limited qualifications to these
seemingly sweeping prohibitions.13 6 First, in addition to granting
the federal courts jurisdiction over a category of cases, Congress
may invite them, expressly or impliedly, to develop substantive
rules of decision."3 7 More frequently, federal common law operates interstitially as the courts interpret vague statutory language. 18 In a sense, as with Chevron applied to agency enabling
acts, ambiguities in other types of statutes might represent implicit though limited delegations of lawmaking authority to the

erate federal common law in a lawsuit between private parties absent some federal
interest).
136. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1264-71 (1996) (describing the "enclaves" of federal common law, but arguing that only some of these are consistent with Erie's dual concerns over federalism and separation of powers); id. at 1375 ("Many of these [federal
common law] rules can be justified in terms of the constitutional structure because
they govern matters beyond the legislative competence of the states and implement
various aspects of the constitutional scheme."); cf. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:
The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885-95, 906-12 (1986)
(identifying enclaves of federal common law and arguing in favor of an even broader
recognition of the power to generate it); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 805, 807-09, 851 (1989) (favoring the development of federal common
law on the basis of "carefully considered national substantive policy").
137. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642 ("Federal common law also may come into
play when Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered
them to create governing rules of law." (emphasis added)); see also Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 1l, 110 (1989) (ERISA); National Soc'y of Profl
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (Sherman Act); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (Taft-Hartley Act).
138. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S., 151, 172 (1983);
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-17 (1981) (holding that federal common law became unnecessary when new legislation clarified a previously ambiguous
question); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
("[Tihe inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial
federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts."); D'Oench, Dubme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Federal common
law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by them.
Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional common-law
technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law . .. ."
(footnote omitted)); Field, supra note 136, at 888-89, 895, 927-30 (explaining that a
federal court need only point to some federal enactment, such as the Constitution, a
statute, or even an agency regulation, in order to justify generating federal common
law).
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federal courts, 139 4but even this understanding represents a controversial claim.

1

In addition, federal courts may generate common law in order
to promote the interests of the federal government' or where

139. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994) ("It is entirely
possible-indeed, highly probable-that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue . . . , Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by
the courts."); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32
(1988); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 373 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("The wide open spaces in statutes such as [the Sherman Act] are most appropriately interpreted as implicit delegations of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps
in the common-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication."); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981); William F. Baxter, Separation
of Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the 'Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law,
60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982); Robert N. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA L. REV.
711, 715 (1982) ("[Llegislatures sometimes use intentionally vague or broad language
in order to delegate to judges the authority to refine the meaning of a statute in
the context of applying it to specific cases."); Field, supra note 136, at 935-42; Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 32-46
(1985); Arthur S. Miller, Statutory Language and the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42
VA. L. REV. 23, 30-31 (1956).
140. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 785,
789, 792-99 (1989) (distinguishing between genuine judicial interpretation of statutes
and the creation of federal common law); id. at 792 ("T]here can be no such thing
as 'federal common law,' at least to the extent it is used to provide a 'rule of
decision' and to the extent the phrase 'common law' is construed as a category of
lawmaking distinct from constitutional or statutory 'interpretation."). Of course, Congress has delegated explicit power to the federal courts to promulgate rules of procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and ProceduralEfficacy, 87 GEo. L.J. 887,
892 (1999). Yet, even then, the Court gives its own handiwork only a limited presumption of validity when addressing a challenge to a rule. See Karen Nelson
Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1071-72 & 1072 n.153 (1993).
141. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988) (government contractor defense); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27
(1979) (federal lending programs); Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 592-94 (land acquisition); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964) (uniform
federal "act of state" doctrine); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
366-67 (1943) (commercial paper). But see O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,
87-89 (1994) (declining to generate federal common law based on an alleged federal
interest); Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 915
(1996) ("Only in the last few years have the Court's opinions [such as O'Melveny]
signalled a substantial decline in the common law making powers of the federal
courts.").
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necessary to resolve disputes that arise between states.1 42 For a
period of time in the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, federal courts
seemed quite willing to make common law and recognize private
rights of action for statutory infractions so long as Congress had
not expressly foreclosed such a remedy. 1' That permissive era
has now passed as the Supreme Court demands evidence that
Congress actually intended to provide for private rights of action.'
The Court has offered various rationales for limiting the occasions for making federal common law, some of which may resonate in the administrative arena to undermine claims that agen-

cies should act in a capacity somehow akin to common law
courts. A separation of powers justification may underlie the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie insofar as the assertion of the
power to announce common law amounts to a usurpation of the

142. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal
courts has also provided the basis for the development of a body of common law.
See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
143. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (conceding
"that in the past our cases have held that in certain circumstances a private right
of action may be implied in a statute not expressly providing one," but declining to
find one for the violation of a provision of the Securities Exchange Act); see also
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979) (implying a private
right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 in part because,
at the time of enactment, Congress must have been aware of the Supreme Court's
liberal approach to this question); id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (conceding
that past decisions implying a private right of action "gave Congress good reason to
think that the federal judiciary would undertake this task"); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (implying a private right of action for the violation of a
provision of the Securities Exchange Act).
144. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992); Karahalios v. National
Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) ("Congress undoubtedly was
aware . . . that the Court had departed from its prior standard . . . and that such
issues were being resolved by a straight-forward inquiry into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("While some opinions of the Court have placed
considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying private rights of action in
order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute ...
what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the
private remedy asserted . . .).
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legislative function by the federal courts, at least absent an
express delegation of such a power from Congress."15 Concerns
about federalism as well as equal protection for similarly situated
litigants provide other rationales against the creation of federal
common law."' Although these concerns seemingly would have
less force in the administrative context, the courts do promote
federalism goals there when they prevent agencies from displacing state law absent specific statutory authority to preempt."47
Somewhat ironically, Professor Sunstein draws parallels between Chevron and Erie insofar as both decisions rejected the
notion that "federal courts could neutrally declare 'the law'" and
then "reallocate[d] legal authority from federal courts to other
145. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-17 (1981); Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); see also George D. Brown, Of Activism and
Erie: The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal
Courts, 69 IOwA L. REV. 617, 620-22, 646-49 (1984); Duffy, supra note 59, at 145
("No mere coincidence explains the uncanny resemblance between the requirement
that federal courts have statutory or constitutional authority for generating common
law and the similar requirement that executive authorities must have such a basis
for taking executive action.").
146. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-80; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-69
(1965) (emphasizing Erie's equal protection strand); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (noting Erie's federalism strand); Field, supra note
136, at 902-05, 931-34 (canvassing the possible constitutional and statutory rationales underlying the Erie decision).
147. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) ("[A]n
agency literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it."). As the
Court went on to emphasize: "An agency may not confer power upon itself. To permit an agency to expand its power in the face of a congressional limitation on its
jurisdiction would be to grant to the agency power to override Congress. This we are
both unwilling and unable to do." Id. at 374-75; see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.),
N-A, 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (assuming without deciding that a court must independently determine "whether a statute is pre-emptive"); California State Bd. of
Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Jack W. Campbell, IV,
Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 844
(1998) ("Instead of asking whether anything in the statute indicates that Congress
would disapprove of the agency's decision to preempt, the court should ask whether
the statute evinces clear congressional intent to delegate preemptive power."); Lars
Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the 'Need to
Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 353 (1994) (discussing the power of agencies to preempt state regulation). But cf. City of New York
v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 66-70 (1988) (upholding an agency's assertion of jurisdiction
over cable television systems and preemption of state law notwithstanding statutory
ambiguity on this score).
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It is important, however, to understand precisely

to which other institutions the authority was reallocated-state
courts and/or Congress. The former have a distinctly broader

range of subject matter jurisdiction than do federal agencies,
and viewing Erie instead as announcing a preference for legis-

lative over judicial lawmaking would undermine his thesis. Like
Professor Sunstein's characterization of Chevron as "counter-

Marbury," this analogy to Erie serves more to obfuscate than
illuminate,1 49 though it does provide an appropriate transition
into the closely related issues concerning the legitimate subject
matter jurisdiction of federal courts and agencies.
Unlike state courts, federal courts lack general subject matter
jurisdiction. 150 Federal courts have jurisdiction to determine

148. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1057 n.215; see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) ("[WIhile not abdicating their ultimate judicial
responsibility to determine the law, . . . judges ought to refrain from substituting
their own interstitial lawmaking for that of the Federal Reserve, so long as the
latter's lawmaking is not irrational.").
149. His reference to Erie apparently also suggested a more general proposition,
unrelated to the particular question of whether the courts or agencies should have
the power to make federal common law, about the potential consequences of changed
background understandings on doctrine: in Erie, about the very nature of the common law; here, about the prominence of agencies. Professor Lessig has described this
"Erie-effect" model as follows:
The pattern has two steps: the first, the emergence of a kind of
contestability about a practice within a legal institution (brought about
by either a change in that practice, a change in the understandings
about that practice, or a change in both); the second, a restructuring of
that practice to avoid the rhetorical costs of that contestability. In Erie,
the contestability was about the judicial role in the articulation of federal
general common law. The response was to transfer the practice to another
institution-the states. In other cases, the contestability will differ, and
so will the response.
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1795 (1997).
150. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95
(1981) ("[Federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers."); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Oliver v. Trunkline Gas Co., 789 F.2d 341, 343 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction by origin and design,
implementing a basic principle of our system of limited government."); Field, supra
note 136, at 899; cf. Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695
(1999) (urging that state courts emulate, for entirely prudential reasons, the jurisdic-
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whether they have subject matter jurisdiction over a particular
case. 5 ' Nonetheless, federal courts recognize the importance of
exercising self-restraint for reasons of both separation of powers
and federalism, and, therefore, they narrowly construe congressional grants of jurisdiction, which are the equivalent of enabling statutes for the judiciary. 5 2 In the same year that it
decided Erie, the Supreme Court explained: "A court does not
have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction over
matters beyond the scope of the authority granted to it by its
creators."53 Indeed, courts start with a presumption that they

tional caution evident in the federal courts).
151. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1970) (noting "the truism that a
court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction"); Shannon v.
Shannon, 965 F.2d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1992) ('A primordial element of our jurisprudence is that federal courts have jurisdiction to determine whether they have subject
matter jurisdiction.").
152. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989); Bread Political Action
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 584 (1982); Victory Carriers, Inc.
v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which [a federal] statute has
defined.'" (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)); Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850);
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.);
Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Guiseppi v. Walling,
144 F.2d 608, 620-22 (2d Cir. 1944) (drawing a parallel between delegations to agencies and courts); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV.
499, 502 (1995) ("The Supreme Court has aggressively used federalism as the basis
for limiting federal judicial power . . . ."); cf. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words:
Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 135
(1998) ("[Flederal jurisdiction cases present unique concerns because they involve the
judiciary interpreting its own power--often construing legislative and constitutional
provisions that say nothing about the judiciary having any prerogative to define its
own authority."). But cf David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 543, 567 n.138 (1985) (noting occasionally expansive judicial interpretations of
jurisdictional statutes).
153. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (explaining that "federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction"); American Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951) (emphasizing that subject matter jurisdiction should be
"carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation"). For overviews of the
longstanding controversy about the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Colloquy, Article III and the Judiciary Act
of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990); Symposium, Congress and the Courts: Ju-
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lack subject matter jurisdiction and place the burden of demonstrafing otherwise on the party seeking to invoke the judicial
power. 15
Thus, the Supreme Court recently repudiated the assertion of
"hypothetical jurisdiction," which lower courts had begun to use
in order to reach the merits and dismiss with prejudice clearly
unmeritorious lawsuits rather than trying to resolve more complicated questions of subject matter jurisdiction in such cases.155
It also has rejected the theory of "protective jurisdiction," which
some had suggested as a basis for asserting federal question
jurisdiction-with or without a concomitant common law power
-notwithstanding complete congressional silence on the matter.156 For similar reasons, agencies should not be able to assert
a general lawmaking competence whenever Congress fails to
forbid it explicitly. Like the federal (as opposed to state) courts,
agencies can exercise only whatever limited subject matter jurisdiction Congress has decided to grant them. 5 '
risdiction and Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998).
154. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) ("It is to be
presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." (citations omitted));
Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996) (describing the "presumption against
subject matter jurisdiction that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to
federal court").
155. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) ("We decline to endorse [a hypothetical jurisdiction] approach because it carries the courts
beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers."); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical
Jurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 280-337 (1999) (applauding
the Courlfs decision to repudiate this doctrine, but suggesting that it is not dead
yet); id. at 241 ([A]s a general matter, Article III courts tend to construe their
conferred jurisdictional authority narrowly.").
156. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
("[N]or does the existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal
courts are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress
acts."); Walls v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) ("It is by no
means enough that, as we may assume, Congress could under the Constitution
readily enact a complete code of law governing transactions in federal mineral leases
among private parties. Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace
state law is primarily a decision for Congress."); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473-77 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Field, supra
note 136, at 923-27 (discussing Erie's ambiguity with regard to the lawmaking powers of the federal courts).
157. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988
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Apart from how they might affect institutional relationships,
the competing metaphors suggest quite different decisionmaking styles. As Edward Levi explained half a century ago,
courts approach statutory, constitutional, and common law questions with distinct types of reasoning. 5 " For instance, common
law decision making typically involves the accumulation of particular decisions followed by their application to new cases,
while text-based decision making requires the application of
general, often ambiguous, provisions to particular cases. 159 State
courts of general subject matter jurisdiction may look to statutes
for guidance in common law decision making outside of the
boundaries covered by statute, 6 ° but federal courts and agencies
do not enjoy the same preexisting general subject matter jurisdiction. Although they sometimes overlap, the common law metaphor for agency enabling acts inappropriately conflates these
generally distinct styles of decision making.
In particular, today's broad rulemaking initiatives do not
comport as well as adjudicatory decision making by agencies
with the common law metaphor, which connotes an incremental
and cautious lawmaking model. Perhaps, as Professor Sunstein
suggests, the NLRB is appropriately viewed as comparable to a
common law tribunal.' 6 ' As the Supreme Court once noted:

DUKE L.J. 257, 262 ("Unlike courts, commissions have jurisdiction over limited types
of subject matter; they are called upon to decide complex or routine matters on a
repetitive basis.").
158. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5-8, 27-28
(1949). For other works expressing varying views on these similarities and differences, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-80 (1982);
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50-103 (1988); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247-61, 286-302 (1990); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 167-90 (1996).
159. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 179, 186-90 (1986).
160. See Robert E. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in
Common-Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 556-57, 599 (1982); see also William S.
Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOzO L. REV. 799, 823-26 (1985) (describing the Progressive Era's claim that
courts could use statutes as sources from which to draw analogies and the subsequent repudiation of this view); Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in CommonLaw Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 415-24 (1968). Resorting to legislative history
or dynamic approaches to statutory interpretation does, however, bring a common
law style to the enterprise.
161. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1061.
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The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier
decisions froze the development of... national labor law
would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking.... The responsibility to adapt the Act to 1changing
2
patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.
The FTC and the SEC may merit the same characterization, 6 3
but it hardly follows that other agencies that engage primarily
in rulemaking, like the EPA or the FDA, deserve the same appellation.
In the past, the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between these various types of regulatory bodies, sustaining restrictions on the President's power to remove officers of independent
agencies precisely because of their quasi-judicial functions.'6

162. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975), quoted with approval
in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (1990); see also
NLRB v. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); Mark H. Grunewald,
The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism,41 DUKE L.J. 274, 274-82
(1991) (explaining the NLRB's traditional preference for adjudication). These delegations also may call for fairly close involvement by Article III courts as happens
when the NLRB must petition for the enforcement of one of its adjudicatory orders.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994).
163. See FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225-26 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1965); see also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 401 (1981) ("The three decades from the
New Deal to the mid-1960's were the halcyon days of incrementalist thought in
administrative law."); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) ("Since the
Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively
through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad
hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the
Holding Company Act."). Chenery recognized that there is "a very definite place for
the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards," id. at 203, though still subject to
judicial review, see id. at 207. But cf id. at 212 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court's "holding that absence of a legal basis is no ground on which courts may
annul" an administrative order).
164. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353-56 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-30 (1935), cited with approval in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 724-25, 739 (1986); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
380-97 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of an independent rulemaking agency);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-97 (1988) (sustaining the constitutionality of an
independent prosecutorial agency); Greene, supra note 71, at 156-77 (defending the
constitutionality of independent agencies, without respect to the characterization of
their functions, as diffusing concentrated power away from the President); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
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Although one legitimately may quibble with these sorts of characterizations and associated judgments about the constitutionality
of such arrangements, 6 5 these decisions usefully draw attention
to the somewhat distinct decision-making styles, only some of
which comport with the common law process. In short, Professor
Sunstein's metaphor sweeps too broadly. Only when Congress
establishes an adjudicatory agency somewhat insulated from the
President's direct supervision can one legitimately argue that it
has delegated a common law task, and even then the agency
must be constrained to operate only in a clearly demarcated
field.
C. Chevron Deference and "Jurisdictional"Questions
To the extent that it more clearly lodges primary interpretive
authority in agencies rather than the courts,'6 6 Chevron generally
supports the common law metaphor for enabling statutes. When
agencies lack rulemaking or similar authority to implement
their enabling statute, however, courts have accorded them no
7
special deference on questions of statutory interpretation.1

Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 667-69 (1984) (concluding that agencies play a role
in maintaining the balance between the President and Congress). But see Stephen L.
Carter, Constitutional Improprieties:Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 357, 404-06 (1990) (questioning the constitutional status of independent agencies). See generally Symposium, The Independence of
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215.
165. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw
over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.").
166. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 969-70 (1992) ("[R]ead for all it is worth, the decision would make administrative actors the primary interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the
largely inert role of enforcing unambiguous statutory terms."); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994) (claiming that a "strong
reading of Chevron essentially transfers the primary responsibility for interpreting
regulatory statutes from the courts to the agency authorized to administer the statute").
167. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991); Merck &
Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), affd sub nom. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 516 U.S. 152 (1996); cf Sutton v.
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Chevron deference also does not extend to agency interpretations
of ambiguous language in statutes other than those entrusted to
that agency to administer. Thus, in the course of complying with
a collateral statute such as the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA),'68 an agency would receive no particular solicitude
from a reviewing court.'69 The same happens when multiple
agencies administer a statute,' ° even though a proponent of the
common law metaphor might well cherish the experimentation

brought to the interpretive task if various federal and state
agencies received Chevron deference when construing statutes
other than their own enabling acts. 17 1 Finally, courts do not exUnited Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145-46 (1999) (declining to decide what
deference should be given to the EEOC's regulations defining "physical impairment"
where the ADA had not delegated authority to interpret the term "disability" to any
agency); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (extending deference to
an agency with the power to make policy through case-by-case adjudication); EEOC
v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1988) (deferring to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language because it enjoyed primary enforcement responsibility); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228,
230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the lack of rulemaking power should not
matter).
168. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4361 (1994)).
169. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 46
F.3d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Air N. Am. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 937 F.2d
1427, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1991); Board of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 917 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1990); Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d
956, 959 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Wlhere agencies interpret statutes outside their administrative ken, it is not clear that their interpretations are entitled to any particular
deference, because they are not 'specialists' in the operation of those statutes.");
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. West, 31 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (D. Alaska 1998)
(holding that an interpretation of NEPA by the Army Corps of Engineers was not
entitled to Chevron deference).
170. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
151-58 (1991); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, '642 n.30 (1986);
Rapaport v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Benavides v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 995 F.2d 269, 272 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1993); see also Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Our difficulty is not any logical conundrum in deferring to both agencies when
they disagree. It is instead that a dispute about the agencies' jurisdiction is a zero-sum
game ...
."); Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations:Inter-Agency
Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REv. 35, 73 (1991) ("In many instances where administrative
authority is divided between two or more agencies, no single agency's authority is
necessarily superior. Courts have been unable to apply the deference rule in these
situations.").
171. Cf. Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
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tend Chevron deference to prosecutorial agencies such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), in part because of their incentives
to interpret criminal statutes expansively.'72
The reason for declining to extend deference in these contexts
turns on the failure of Congress to delegate implicit interpretive
authority to that agency, one of the main premises underlying
Chevron.'7 3 In Chevron, the Court had deferred to an agency's
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 315 (1998) ("A central lesson of the limitations of New Deal institutions is that effective government services and regulations
must be continuously adapted and recombined to respond to diverse and changing
local conditions . . . ."); Weiser, supra note 63, at 39-44 (challenging assumptions
about the benefits of uniformity in the interpretation of federal statutes, and arguing
that the extension of Chevron deference to state agencies involved in cooperative
federalism schemes will promote beneficial experimentation).
172. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177-78 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 599 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994); United States
v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Sanford N. Greenberg, Who
Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PrIT. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1996) (defending
the refusal to extend Chevron deference to the interpretation of criminal statutes).
But cf Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 469, 488-89, 496-99 (1996) (advocating "Chevronizing" federal criminal law by
extending deference to the Justice Department's interpretations, in part to counteract
the risk of self-dealing and overreaching by individual U.S. attorneys when they
pursue novel prosecutorial theories). Courts would not defer to agency interpretations
of constitutional provisions even in those situations where agency personnel could
provide valuable expertise, such as the likely consequences of competing interpretations of the Fourth Amendment on law enforcement activities or of the Fifth
Amendment on the operation of welfare programs. Cf. David A. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 113, 114-16, 123 (1993) (explaining that, although executive officials inevitably interpret constitutional provisions, they receive no deference from reviewing courts).
173. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 153 (explaining that "familiarity and policymaking
expertise account in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates
interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the reviewing court");
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344, 865-66 (1984); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 137 F.3d
640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should
Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25, 32-35 (1990) (discussing
Chevron's distinction between explicit and implicit delegations of interpretive authority);
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516-17; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 310 (1986) (noting Chevron's recognition that imprecise enabling legislation reflects "an implicit, but nonetheless valid, delegation of authority
to the agency"). A different rationale is grounded on the separation of powers, premised on the supposedly greater though indirect political accountability of agencies
than the courts. See Pauly v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991);
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interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision "within the
limits of that delegation,"1 74 in part on the notion that such an
ambiguous delegation invited interstitial lawmaking. As the
Supreme Court explained in a more recent decision, "it is fundamental 'that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in
which it has no jurisdiction."17 5 Where an agency with rulemaking authority purports to implement its enabling act but arguably exceeds its jurisdiction, the question may be harder to resolve; the rationale against extending deference, however, would
be the same. If the agency had not, in fact, been authorized to
regulate a particular activity based on a reviewing court's best
understanding of the meaning of the statute, then the agency's
contrary view should deserve no special attention because, as
found by that court, Congress never intended to delegate to that
agency any such interpretive power.
Courts and commentators remain divided about the advisability
and practicality of extending Chevron deference to questions of
an agency's jurisdiction under its enabling statute. 176 Some have
argued against any deference in these situations because of an
agency's vested interest in expanding its jurisdiction.1 7v Indeed,

Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 821, 823-24 (1990).
174. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
175. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973)); accord SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119 (1978); see also ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[Ilt seems highly unlikely that a responsible Congress would implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of its own power.").
176. See O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that "it
is unclear whether deference is appropriate under such circumstances").
177. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 386-87
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. New York Shipping
Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1363 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note
89, at 1006-18; Bernard Schwartz, Some Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 28
TULSA L.J. 793, 806-08 (1993); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1564-65 & n.261 (1992); Eric M.
Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretationof Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986, 1005-07 (1987); cf Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 595-96, 598 (1985) (arguing that the courts should "consciously restrict their independent judgments to the
'cognitive' core of interpretation where constitutional notions of legislative supremacy
and conventional notions of institutional competence conspire most strongly against
administrative hegemony" (footnote omitted)); Herz, supra note 83, at 216-21 (dis-
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7v
Professor Sunstein once made this claim quite persuasively."
Others have taken the position that no clear demarcation exists
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions, which
means that Chevron deference should apply across the board.17 9
Professor Sunstein now espouses this position. 8 °
The Supreme Court has provided confusing signals on this
question. For instance, in one recent decision, the Court refused

agreeing with the strong reading of Chevron even if jurisdictional issues are not
readily distinguishable from other statutory questions).
178. See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 467-68; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2097-101 (1990) (arguing against
deference on jurisdictional questions, but also recognizing the strength of contrary
arguments); id. at 2099 ("Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to have the
authority to decide on the extent of their own powers. To accord such power to
agencies would be to allow them to be judges in their own cause, in which they are
of course susceptible to bias."). He apparently continues to recognize the potential
strength of these arguments against deference in this context. See Sunstein, supra
note 51, at 1063 ("[P]erhaps an agency does not have, under Chevron, the power to
determine its own jurisdiction. As a matter of first principles, it is unclear whether
Chevron deference should be due to an agency involved in a jurisdictional determination."); id. ("The likelihood of bias and self-dealing might well be taken to argue
against deference to jurisdictional judgments.").
179. See, e.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 54-55 (1990) (White, J.,
dissenting); Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 381-82 (Scalia, J., concurring); Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 676-77 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, any issue may readily be characterized as jurisdictional merely by manipulating the level of generality at which it is
framed. . . . Such pliable labels should not control the scope of review."); Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Air Courier Conference of AmJInt'l Comm. v. United States Postal Serv.,
959 F.2d 1213, 1223-25 (3d Cir. 1992); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1988); Quincy M. Crawford,
Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the
Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 968-83 (1994) (arguing in favor of
deference on jurisdictional questions).
180. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1064 ("Chevron is in part a recognition of the
comparative advantages of agencies over courts, stemming from the agencies' greater
factfinding power and electoral legitimacy, and those comparative advantages seem
to apply to jurisdictional determinations as well."); id. at 1063-64 (agreeing that
"[tihis is a thin and shifting line; most assertions of agency power can be deemed
jurisdictional,'" adding that the FDA's determination that a category of products is a
"drug" under its regulatory jurisdiction "is more in the nature of an application of a
statutory term to a disputed case than a judgment that the FDA has authority over
a whole class of cases that may or may not fit within a statutory term"). In an
earlier article urging that courts could review agency inaction, he characterized just
such an FDA determination as "jurisdictional." Sdnstein, supra note 117, at 676-77.
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to defer to an agency's expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction under its enabling act but failed to mention Chevron,181
while in a few other recent decisions, the Court extended Chevron deference to agency interpretations narrowing the reach of
their jurisdiction. 82 Such an asymmetry in approach would
make sense if the Supreme Court was more concerned about the
83
undue expansion as opposed to contraction of agency powers.1

181. See Federal Election Comn'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 9397 (1994).
[W]e do not think that the provisions discussed above, authorizing the
FEC to litigate in the federal courts, are the sort of provisions that can
be said to be within the province of the agency to interpret. [A prior Supreme Court decision,] relied upon by the FEC, dealt with the FEC's
interpretation of a substantive provision of the FECA, not with the provisions authorizing independent litigation.
Id. at 97; see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 226-29 (1994)
(declining to extend Chevron deference to the FCC's effort to exempt certain longdistance carriers under its authority to "modify" the tariff-filing provisions of its enabling act); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 509 (1992) (declining
to extend Chevron deference to the attorney general's expansive interpretation of his
jurisdiction to review changes in a local government under the Voting Rights Act
because the statute is unambiguous); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 367-75 (1986) (rejecting the Board's broad interpretation of the jurisdictional term "banks"); Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 951 F.2d 950, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the term "common carrier" limits the Commission's jurisdiction). But cf California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 766 (1999) (sustaining, without needing to
extend Chevron deference, the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over certain
nonprofit trade associations as representing the better interpretation of its enabling
act); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841-47 (1986) (accepting, without needing to extend Chevron deference, an agency's assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction over common law counterclaims, though adding that it would
have deferred if the jurisdictional question had been ambiguous); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-39 (1985) (upholding an expansive
interpretation of the scope of the Army Corps of Engineers' authority over "navigable
waters" to include adjacent freshwater wetlands).
182. See Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 526 U.S. 449, 452-56
(1999) (deferring to the agency's position that it did not have 'jurisdiction to review
a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination"); Reiter v.
Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993) (extending Chevron deference to the ICC's determination that it did not have jurisdiction to award reparations); Massachusetts v.
Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116-19 (1989); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 232-33, 241 (1986). Courts rarely order agencies to exercise jurisdiction that they have declined. See Office Employees Intl Union v. NLRB, 353
U.S. 313, 318-20 (1957); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 674-76,
685 (1954).
183. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
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It also conforms to the implicit delegation rationale of Chevron

insofar as one thinks it implausible that Congress would have
given agencies free reign to expand their range of operations."
It is not impossible to find a line of demarcation between jurisdictional and other statutory questions.'85 Courts do so all of the
time in other contexts, undeterred by the genuine difficulties
that theyencounterinmaking appropriate characterizations. 8 6 For
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 371, 379-81 (1986); Merrill, supra note 166, at 1024 (suggesting
that the Court sometimes fails to invoke Chevron because of its sense that a critical
function of judicial review is to police overreaching or other abuses of power by
agencies).
184. See Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 89, at 1011 ("It is presumptively unlikely
that Congress intended to allow an agency to decide for itself whether an area of
regulation is within its regulatory jurisdiction where the enabling legislation is silent
on that authority."); see also id. at 1018 ("By its terms, Chevron does not apply to
extension of an agency's jurisdiction beyond its core powers. In making such extraterritorial judgments, the agency is no longer filling gaps but annexing new territory."); Note, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1725-27,
1731, 1735-39 (1999) (elaborating on the implicit delegation theory, and suggesting a
refinement that distinguishes between different types of ambiguity in statutory language); id. at 1736 ("[Vlague terms are continuous . . . . Agencies can resolve such
indeterminacies through line-drawing and the balancing of relevant factors and interests. Ambiguous terms, however, have discontinuous meanings and thus often require
interpreters to choose between what are essentially two different laws."); id. at 1739
("Dividing labor in this fashion not only comports with congressional intent, but also
allocates distinct tasks to agencies and courts that fit their respective expertise and
roles in government.").
185. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utis. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-86 (1999) (sustaining
the FCC's assertion of "jurisdiction" to issue regulations permitting local competition
by long-distance carriers); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(suggesting that "a pivotal distinction exists between statutory provisions that are
jurisdictional in nature-that is, provisions going to the agency's power to regulate
an activity or substance-and provisions that are managerial-that is, provisions
pertaining to the mechanics or inner workings of the regulatory process" (citations
omitted)). For example, courts must draw such lines in assessing claims that municipalities have acted in an ultra vires fashion. See 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 28,
§ 10.18.10, at 366.
186. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) ("'Jurisdiction,' it has been observed, 'is a word of many, too many meanings.'" (quoting United
States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996))); Nowak v. Ironworkers
Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that, while the
distinction "appears straightforward in theory, it is often much more difficult in
practice"); Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction,22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 683, 687-96, 721-24 (1981) (lamenting the unpredictability and incoherence of the rules of federal subject matter jurisdiction); Idleman, supra note 155, at
321-32 (cataloging some of the difficulties in characterizing issues as 'jurisdictional");
see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985) ("[W]e need not and do not
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instance, lack of subject matter jurisdiction is one of the only preliminary objections not considered waived by a failure to assert
it promptly after the commencement of an action.1 87 Defects in
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent; indeed, a
court may raise the issue sua sponte even for the first time on
appeal, 8' which presupposes that judges can distinguish between jurisdictional and other objections raised during litigation.
In addition, valid jurisdictional objections should lead to a
dismissal without prejudice, whereas the failure to state a claim
requires a judgment on the merits. 8 9 Moreover, when asked to
accord res judicata effect to a prior judgment or to enforce a
foreign judgment, courts occasionally may inquire into the subject matter jurisdiction or competence of the rendering court
even though they generally will not entertain other collateral
attacks on the judgment. 19 Thus, in civil litigation, courts must

address the thorny question of the FDA's jurisdiction."); id. at 833 n.4 (noting that
the courts may review agency inaction "based solely on the belief that it lacks jurisdiction).
187. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties
or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action."); Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781,
786 (2d Cir. 1994).
188. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999) (rejecting the suggestion that, at
least in the removal context, a court must address objections to subject matter jurisdiction before personal jurisdiction and other threshold questions).
189. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (noting that "it is well settled that
the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and
not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction"); Capitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d
188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). Where a statute provides the basis for asserting a
claim, the distinction may blur. See, e.g., Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1187-89; cf. Steel, 523
U.S. at 90-93 (treating the right to bring a citizen suit under the statute as
nonjurisdictional); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365
(1994) ("The question of whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is not
jurisdictional.").
190. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39, 444 (1940) (allowing collateral
attack on state court foreclosure judgments against farmers entered without subject
matter jurisdiction because federal bankruptcy petitions were then pending); see also
Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that "a judgment rendered by a court assuming subject-matter jurisdiction and sustained on direct appeal is entitled to preclusive effect as long as the District Court
did not 'plainly usurp jurisdiction' over the action"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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routinely draw distinctions between subject matter jurisdiction
and other types of potentially dispositive issues.
Jurisdiction is a concept recognized in administrative law as
well. The APA utilizes the term to describe limits on agency
powers and grounds for judicial invalidation. 191 In the years
before the Court decided Chevron, Congress seriously considered
amending the APA to reinforce the judicial function in reviewing
192
statutory questions, particularly on jurisdictional issues.
Courts occasionally also have to mediate "turf battles" between
agencies with apparently overlapping jurisdiction. 9 3 The Su-

JUDGmENTs § 12 (1982) (allowing limited collateral attacks based on the absence of

subject matter jurisdiction); cf. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) ("[A] judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as to questions of jurisdiction-when
the second court's inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly
litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.");
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938) (same); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral
Attack on Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A Critique of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 560-63 (1981) (arguing that normal res judicata
rules generally should bar collateral attacks based on objections to a rendering
court's subject matter jurisdiction); Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 222-23 (1977) (same).
191. See 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1994) ("A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive
rule or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law."); id. § 706(2)(C) (instructing reviewing courts to "hold unlawful and
set aside agency action" found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right").
192. See H.R. 746, 97th Cong. § 203(c) (1982) (proposing to require that courts
independently determine "whether the agency's action is within the scope of the
agency's jurisdiction"); see also Ronald M. Levin, Review of "Jurisdictional"Issues
Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DuKE L.J. 355, 366-78 (criticizing this proposal
for promoting indiscriminate deregulation and resting on a false dichotomy between
jurisdictional and other statutory questions); supra note 90 (discussing a similar
amendment to Florida's APA); cf. S.343, 104th Cong. § 627(a) (1995) (proposing that
'any rule that expands Federal power or jurisdiction beyond the level of regulatory
action needed to satisfy statutory requirements shall be prohibited"); Easterbrook,
supra note 100, at 535-36 ("The distinction between [statutory] application and interpretation is a line worth drawing-however difficult to maintain-because, ... before courts begin the process of 'construction,' they ascertain that the legislature has
conferred the power of interpretation."); Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of
Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEo. L.J. 1, 62 (1985) (concluding, in evaluating
another aspect of the Bumpers Amendment, that "the task of identifying questions of
law during judicial review of administrative action need not be nearly as elusive or
subjective as is widely believed").
193. See, e.g., Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 6-8
(1985) (per curiam); American Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 830-31
(D.D.C. 1974) (invalidating FDA restrictions on the distribution of methadone as a
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preme Court once suggested characterizing as "jurisdictional"
certain factual issues in the course of defining the appropriate
194
intensity of judicial review of agencies' adjudicatory decisions.
In applying exhaustion requirements, which are sometimes
characterized as a recognition of an agency's "primary jurisdiction" to resolve a disputed matter, 195 courts have recognized a

condition of drug approval because the DEA properly exercised this power), affd, 530
F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam); cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93-97 (1994) (holding that only the DOJ and not the
FEC could petition the Court for certiorari in this case); Exec. Order No. 12,146, §
1401, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657, 42,658 (1979) ("Whenever two or more Executive agencies are unable to resolve a legal dispute between them, including the question of
which has jurisdiction to administer a particular program or to regulate a particular
activity, each agency is encouraged to submit the dispute to the Attorney General.").
The same issues arise when courts must allocate regulatory jurisdiction between
federal and state agencies. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-86
(1999); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1930); see also supra
note 147 (discussing limits on regulatory preemption).
194. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 n.17 (1932) ("In relation to administrative agencies, the Ijurisdictionall question in a given case is whether it falls within
the scope of the authority validly conferred."). Although the Court in Crowell sustained the delegation of adjudicatory authority to a federal agency subject only to
limited judicial review, it demanded de novo review of facts underlying the assertion
of jurisdiction. See id. at 54-57. This notion has, however, been criticized. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 138 (4th ed.
1999) (noting that Crowell's jurisdictional-fact doctrine "has suffered much criticism,
and doubts have often been expressed by judges and commentators alike as to its
continued vitality" (footnotes omitted)); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 249, 259-60 (1985). But cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915,
989-91 (1988) (defending this distinction).
195. See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1993) (distinguishing between doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409
U.S. 289, 304-08 (1973) (allowing agency to first exercise its probable 'jurisdiction");
id. at 310 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("An agency cannot have primary jurisdiction
over a dispute when it probably lacks jurisdiction in the first place."); AmAN &
MAITON, supra note 83, § 12.11; Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1037, 1037 (1964). Primary jurisdiction is, in part, a form of judicial abstention
to pending agency proceedings or expertise, though sometimes it represents a determination that the agency enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over a matter initially lodged
in a court. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1988);
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973); Williams Pipe Line
Co. v. Empire Gas Corp., 76 F.3d 1491, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1996). Similarly, federal
courts may abstain when a state agency proceeding is pending. See New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1989); Gordon G.
Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law from Burford to
Ankenbrandt. Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and
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futility exception in situations where they find that an agency
lacks the jurisdiction to pursue a pending matter. 196 In addition,
some lower courts have treated justiciability rules codified by
the APA as jurisdictional limits on the availability of judicial
review.' 97 Although one may disagree with some of these different characterizations, and although they undoubtedly present
difficulties in particular cases, courts do not hesitate to distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional issues when
necessary.
Professor Sunstein's apparent change of heart on this question
is especially interesting. Initially, and speaking as a general
matter, he argued quite forcefully against deferring to agency
interpretations of the reach of their jurisdiction. 1 98 More recently,

Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 929-33 (1993) (drawing a parallel between Burford abstention and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
196. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1992); Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 587 (1989); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330-32 (1976); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188-91
(1958); see also United States v. L.A._ Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37-38
(1952) (suggesting that a genuine jurisdictional issue could be raised for the first
time on judicial review of agency action). Where a party only challenges the factual
basis for an agency's assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction over it, however, courts
have required exhaustion. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41,
47-51 (1938) (requiring that a company first challenge the claim that it operated in
interstate commerce in an unfair labor practices proceeding before the NLRB).
197. For decisions characterizing the APA's finality requirement as jurisdictional,
see DRG Funding Corp. v. Secretary of Housing & Urban Dev., 76 F.3d 1212, 1214
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v. FTC, 911 F.2d 261, 264 n.1 (9th Cir.
1990). In addition, courts have treated non-APA justiciability rules as jurisdictional
because they have been derived from Article III. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1998) (standing); McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996) (mootness); Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288,
291 (2d Cir. 1995) (exhaustion); New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64
F.3d 1495, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1995) (ripeness). But cf American Train Dispatchers
Ass'n v. ICC, 949 F.2d 413, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Of these three requirements for
review [i.e., finality, ripeness, and exhaustion], only finality is jurisdictional . .. ").
Courts sometimes treat prudential limitations on judicial review as a weaker form of
jurisdictional objection. See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 669 n.13
(7th Cir. 1998). But cf Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the application of the political question doctrine means that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim rather than that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
198. See supra note 178; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 36, at 143 (contending that
"the notion that administrators may interpret statutes they administer is inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles"); id. ("Institutions limited by a legal restriction are not to be permitted to determine the nature of the limitation, or to
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and in the course of defending the FDA's tobacco regulations,
Professor Sunstein equivocated on this question, suggesting that
courts should defer on these questions after all.199 Undergirding
his shift on this issue was not so much a concern. about the
inability to distinguish betweenjurisdictional and other questions,
which he had previously conceded, but rather a more fundamental reconceptionalization of the nature of enabling statutes.
Whereas he originally analogized organic acts to the Constitution
and emphasized the necessity for some independent judicial
supervision on questions of agency jurisdiction, Professor
Sunstein now generally appears to regard enabling statutes
as broad delegations of power to agencies inviting them to
generate common law principles, in effect displacing the role of
the judiciary entirely.
The claim for the relative institutional competence of agencies
as compared to the courts makes little sense with regard to.
questions concerning statutory authority. Just as some argue
that courts can adapt federal statutes in the face of changing
circumstances better than the legislature, °0 notwithstanding

decide on its scope"); id. at 224 ("A cardinal principle of American constitutionalism
is that those who are limited by law should not be empowered to decide on the
meaning of the limitation: foxes should not guard henhouses. The Chevron rule disregards this principle by permitting agencies to interpret laws that limit and control
their authority.").
199. See supra note 180. Ultimately, he concludes that agencies have become "common law courts in a distinctive sense," recognizing that "the updating and particularizing fuctions of administrative agencies must be disciplined by statutory boundaries . . . and, as a general rule, ambiguous terms should not be taken to cover
cases far beyond the contemplation of the enacting legislature." Sunstein, supra note
51, at 1069. But who will best police those boundaries?
200. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 20, 21, 42-46, 56-61 (1988) (defending a "nautical" rather than "archeological"
metaphor for the process of statutory interpretation undertaken by the federal
courts, though recognizing the increasingly significant interpretative role played by
administrative agencies); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1016 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 493-97 (1989) (arguing that
courts should play an updating function when interpreting statutes in the face of
changed circumstances or obsolescence); id. at 440 (explaining why the judiciary's
independence and deliberative capacity makes it superior to the legislature); see also
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L.
REv. 1023, 1108 (1998) (emphasizing "the courts' superior institutional ability to
keep statutes abreast of changes in the underlying structure of administrative law");
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their lack of expertise or electoral accountability, courts have
important advantages over regulatory agencies when construing
enabling acts. An agency's familiarity with a statute and expertise in its application may well influence a court, but the court
must remain the final arbiter of statutory meaning. Federal
judges are insulated from politics (usually considered a good
thing when it comes to resolving legal disputes)," 1 which helps
2°2
counteract the self-interested behavior of agency officials.
Judges also can take a broader view than the "tunnel vision"
that may afflict bureaucrats. °3 Jurisdictional disputes become
even more pointed when several agencies vie for primary regulatory authority over a field. °4

id. at 1110 n.464 (adding that the courts are also to be preferred to agencies in
many cases: "A system of indiscriminate deference to agency interpretations would
sometimes permit agencies to evade the duties that would be imposed by the best
readings of statutes").
201. See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 1.

202. See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 467-68; Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, SelfInterest, and the APA Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 289 & n.97,
291-92 (1986); see also CALABRESI, supra note 158, at 56 ("To allow the truly dependent agency to act to update our laws would, in fact, be to cut through our checks
and balances by allowing a majoritarian but unrestrained executive to enforce its
views of the popular will .

. . .");

Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 89, at 1009 (ex-

plaining that "agencies have no comparative advantage in reading statutes and that
agency self-interest may cloud its judgment"). Indeed, agency accountability, in the
sense of responsiveness to White House pressure, may actually undercut the agency
expertise rationale. See Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 250-51, 258-62, 270-71 (1993) (providing a
detailed account of President Bush's success in countermanding an expert EPA interpretation of one of its enabling acts).
203. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 10-19 (1993) (describing the problem of tunnel vision); CALABRESI, supra
note 158, at 46-51 (noting that agencies may prefer to ignore inconsistencies between
their enabling statutes and other legislation); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of
JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 493-94 (1982).
204. See supra note 170 (noting Chevron's inapplicability when multiple agencies
interpret a statute). In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354
(1988), Justice Brennan argued:
Deference is particularly inappropriate where . . . the statute is designed
not merely to confine an agency's jurisdiction but to preserve the jurisdiction of other regulators, for Congress could not have intended courts to
defer to one agency's interpretation of the jurisdictional division where
the policies in conflict have purposely been committed to the care of
different regulators.
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The FDA's tobacco regulations, which Professor Sunstein has
strained to defend even if it meant changing his position on the
appropriateness of Chevron deference to jurisdictional questions,
provide a good illustration of these points. As he concedes, President Clinton got behind the FDA's previously unthinkable initiative as a campaign gambit; the jurisdictional questions required
an understanding of the interrelationships of multiple statutes
enacted decades apart (only one of which was entrusted to the
FDA); and no particular scientific or technical expertise helped
inform its resolution. 0 5 Thus, Professor Sunstein's example
undercuts his broader thesis. When it resolves the tobacco
industry's challenge to the agency's novel assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction later this Term, the Supreme Court will have an important opportunity to recalibrate the balance of power between
the three branches of government.20 '

Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1994) (dividing the
power to enforce the Clayton Act among five different agencies); 49 U.S.C. § 1133
(1994) (granting the National Transportation Safety Board the power to review the
decisions of certain agencies within the DOT); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
526 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1999) (treating the Customs Service as the administering
agency whose regulations were entitled to Chevron deference even though other
agencies provided input); United States Dep't of the Navy, Military Sealift Command
v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 836 F.2d 1409, 1415 n.11 (3d Cir. 1988) ("If this
case did not involve a conflict between two statutes whose interpretation is entrusted
to different agencies, these decisions would be entitled to deference."); Diver, supra
note 177, at 596 (arguing that "courts must independently resolve jurisdictional disputes between agencies"); George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model:
Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADINl. L. REV. 315,
349 (1987) (concluding that a broad delegation "is particularly dangerous when regulatory responsibilities are divided between two agencies"); David Barboza & Jeff
Gerth, Who's in Charge? Agency Infighting and Regulatory Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1998, at C14 (describing hostile reaction by the Federal Reserve Board, the
SEC, and the Department of Treasury to an announcement by the chairperson of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission that the Commission might assert jurisdiction over the derivatives market); Stephen Barr, Tasks Sliced Many Ways, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at A17 ("Congress over the years has given numerous agencies
conflicting or fragmented responsibilities that have created much of the current bureaucratic confusion."); Andrea Foster, OSHA Regs Disputed, NAT'L L.J., May 3,
1999, at B1 (describing a possible conflict between recent OSHA proposals and the
NLRB's interpretations of its enabling statute).
205. On the contrary, the enormous factual record amassed by the FDA may have
helped mask a fairly straightforward legal question.
206. As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed, in a 5-4 decision,
the lower court's judgment invalidating the tobacco product regulations because the
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CONCLUSION

Even if they provide a useful means of illustration, undue
reliance on such metaphors may suggest overly facile answers to
difficult legal questions. "° In the case of agency enabling statutes, this Article suggests that some of the analogies recently
proposed by scholars tend to conceal more than they reveal.
Although provocative, Professor Sunstein's common law model
for understanding the operation of regulatory statutes seems the
least defensible of the three general metaphors reviewed.
Analogizing enabling acts to constitutions has greater appeal but
implicitly carries with it a particular interpretive methodology
that may have less justification in the administrative context. If,
instead, we conceive of organic statutes as charters, or as constitutions of specifically enumerated powers that can be embellished somewhat by a necessary and proper clause but not
significantly expanded, then agencies will not as easily upset the
balance of power among the three main branches of government.
The rush to defend seemingly desirable regulatory initiatives
should not blind us to the potentially serious institutional consequences of adopting a stance of excessive faith in administrative
agencies.

FDA lacked jurisdiction. At the end of the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "an administrative agency's power to regulate in the public interest
must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress." FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 98-1152, 2000 WL 289576, at *23 (U.S.
Mar. 21, 2000). In dissent, Justice Breyer unsuccessfully invoked the constitutional
metaphor to defend the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products. See id.
at *23-*24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Cf. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation,41 UCLA
L. REv. 953, 1034 (1994) (concluding that "both the statutory and contractual metaphors
for treaties have failed to satisfy," and that, "without a sense of place for international agreements in the constitutional order and the hierarchy of law, treaty interpretation will remain a frustrating, inconclusive, and potentially dangerous exercise").

